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Executive Summary
Introduction 
In Bangladesh, lack of access to infrastructure services exacerbates poverty by lowering people’s 
income, degrading their health, decreasing the quality of their education and increasing vulnerability 
shocks as refl ected in various global policy instruments such as the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and the Participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). In line with these global 
policy instruments a few national endeavours have already been made for creating an enabling 
environment to improve the quality of people’s life through enhancing access to basic infrastructure 
services. However, the efforts on the ground are still far from adequate.
This case study was undertaken in order to better understand the links between corruption and 
poor people’s inaccessibility to infrastructure services. The objective of the study was to gain a clear 
understanding about effective interventions for the improvement of infrastructure service delivery for 
the poor urban communities. Six infrastructure services such as water supply, sanitation, electricity 
and street lighting, drainage, access to roads and paving and solid waste management have been 
considered under the study. The WEDC Institute, Department of Civil and Building Engineering 
at Loughborough University, UK with due assistance from the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) supported the study.
A combination of both qualitative and quantitative approaches have been adopted in the study and 
information has been collected both from primary and secondary sources. The case study and 
literature review methods specially employed by the study have been supported by a variety of 
tools and techniques. The semi-structured interviews/ informal discussions were conducted at the 
different institutional levels, while the questionnaire-led structured interviews and the FGDs guided 
by checklists were administered at the service recipient level. Besides, to understand the role of civil 
society actors, the consultation method has been used in the study. The survey for the study has 
been conducted at Korail, one of the largest slums in Dhaka city. The simultaneous presentation of 
both quantitative and qualitative information is one of the main features of the study.
The report has been organized into six main sections. The fi rst section is the introductory one that 
includes amongst others the study rationale, methodology, as well as a brief description of the 
different infl uential factors related to the study theme. The second section contains a literature 
review on corruption.  Section III, IV, and V however are the most important sections of the report 
and deal mainly with the fi ndings of the study. Section VI is the concluding chapter of the report and 
incorporates the recommendations for service delivery improvement. Below is a brief summary of 
the study fi ndings.
Access and use of infrastructure services
The study shows that although inadequate, there are reportedly both legal and illegal services in 
the slums (Table A1.1 in appendix I). People do receive service, but complain about its quality and 
price. A mix of Government, NGOs, donors, and private individuals are involved in service delivery. 
The key point is that the whole slum is formally “illegal”. Any services provided are off the books or 
given out of charity. Thus people can’t complain because they always risk being evicted or arrested 
as illegal occupants. Furthermore, the few people able to get connected to services such as water 
or electricity then sell that service to other households at high prices. In addition, the collaboration 
between “musclemen”--that is, middlemen with political clout, and offi cials is key to understanding 
the situation. The study shows that corruption is just one part of a complex system that provides 
low quality services to the poor, maintains political power of some, enriches others, and wastes lots 
of resources. 
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Satisfaction and dissatisfaction with service delivery
The slum dwellers’ satisfaction with the service is very low. Water, electricity and street lighting, 
roads and paving and drainage are reportedly more poorly performed services (Table A1.2 in 
appendix I). In contrast to these, the delivery of sanitation and waste disposal services is better.  At 
one end of the spectrum, on an average less then 10 percent of the respondents are satisfi ed with 
the services relating to roads and paving and electricity and street lighting. Conversely, at the other 
end, 26.7% have expressed their satisfaction with sanitation service and 23% with waste disposal 
service.     
Problems with services
The survey respondents reported a great variety of problems in accessing the services, particularly 
water and electricity services. Irregular and inadequate supply of water, high cost for services, 
their low quality, load shedding, voltage fl uctuation, low voltage, power breakdown, over-billing 
and bribery are reportedly the important barriers to accessing the services. Interestingly, all slum 
dwellers reported their unwillingness to lodge formal complaints with the service providers about 
perceived irregularities as they think such complaints will produce no results. 
Service costs
On the whole, slum dwellers are to spend 50 to 500 taka a month for water. A kolshi of drinking 
water costs 1 taka and sometimes 2 taka. Though sanitation services are generally provided free 
of cost almost 50 percent of the house owners reported to spend at least 50 taka a month for 
accessing this service. The electricity costs however are between 50 to 500 taka a month for every 
household. Majority house owners in general spend 200-300 taka for electricity consumption and 
the relative cost for majority of the tenant households is between taka 51 to 100 a month. Usually, 
the electricity consumption for any single utility such as bulb, fan, television etc. costs 100 taka a 
month. Besides, slum dwellers are to pay taka 200-500 taka in advance for obtaining an electricity 
connection.  
Service providers
Various estimates suggest that there are 40 government / parastatal organizations, 60 non-
government organizations (NGOs) and 1830 community based organizations (CBOs) in the city 
providing various infrastructural services to the city dwellers. Moreover, there are other voluntary 
and informal service providing efforts like garbage collection, traffi c control, or informal courts. 
These organizations operate in isolation from one another and as such there is little coordination 
among them. 
Causes of corruption
Failure to implement law, misuse of power, infl uence peddling, poverty, lack of accountability, 
bureaucratic excesses, mass unawareness, domination by the local elite, absence of commitment 
to moral values, opportunity to make black money, greater scope to evade punishment, low 
salary of the offi cials and lack of access to information are reportedly the causes for corruption in 
delivering services. These all again indicate the lack of appropriate policies/instruments and lack of 
transparency and accountability in the service delivery mechanisms. 
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Effects of corruption
The study further shows that though each and every sphere of society is affected by the corruption 
in infrastructure service delivery, it is the urban poor who are affected most. Well above half of 
the urban poor (65%) reported to have experience economic crisis and debt burdens because 
of paying bribes. More than a quarter (28% tenants) reported that they could not afford to have 
necessary food because of corruption in accessing the basic services. Besides, there are a few 
who noted their deprivation of medical facilities, loss in business and interruption in children’s 
education because of paying bribe. It has been also found that poor people feel powerless and 
helpless when they experience corruption.
Corruption combating strategies
There are both customary and formal accountability mechanisms to combat corruption in 
infrastructure service delivery. Middlemen, local leaders with political affi liation, local government 
representatives, service recipients, and CBOs are found as the principal actors in the customary 
accountability arrangements. Within the formal accountability arrangements there is a multiplicity 
of policy instruments and institutions. These include a few constitutional bodies and some centrally 
produced laws and regulations. Besides, there are specifi c laws and regulations for each of the 
service providing organizations. 
Ironically, none of these regulations has any specifi c mandate to provide the poor with the basic 
services. Also, there is an overlap of functions of the service providing organizations and their 
respective power and authority is not always clear. Amid these policy controversies a hierarchical 
top-down service delivery system is in place that admits of no scope for people’s participation. Thus, 
an overlap of policies and service delivery institutions and lack of appropriate policies together 
with lack of participation of the urban poor in the delivery system have made the decision-making 
process un-transparent and monitoring diffi cult. Lack of accountability and transparency in service 
delivery is therefore leading to corruption and eventually to the exclusion of a large section of the 
urban poor from the infrastructure service net. 
Corruption is embedded in the life of the slum and cannot be tackled in isolation from the conditions 
that produce it. It will do absolutely no good to arrest a few corrupt offi cials because under an honest 
system the poor would receive no services. Thus what is needed is a change in the underlying 
relationship between the slum dwellers and the state. Their status needs to be legalized. There 
need to be legal and safe ways for them to complain, and the implicit subsidies caused by the 
misreading or meters, illegal taping into lines, etc. need to be replaced by legal subsidies. The 
current set-up, where inadequate services are provided corruptly, must be replaced with somewhat 
better services provided honestly.

11. Introduction
1.1  Background
The current development paradigm emphasizes the widening of people’s access to 
infrastructural services as an important step towards poverty reduction, as refl ected in two 
major policy instruments known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 
Participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). These seek to show that lack of 
access to infrastructure services exacerbates poverty by lowering people’s income, degrading 
their health, decreasing the quality of their education and increasing vulnerability shocks.
In Bangladesh there are constitutional provisions for creating an enabling environment to 
improve the quality of life of people through proper access to basic infrastructure services. 
Even, the current PRSP that has been accepted by the World Bank envisages people’s 
adequate access to basic infrastructural services. However, the efforts on the ground are 
still far from adequate. The visible initiatives have so far remained confi ned to the delivery of 
infrastructure packages mostly encompassing the construction of power plants, water plants 
and some other physical infrastructures and the restructuring of a few institutions together with 
a few regulatory measures. But, in reality, such infrastructural packages and restructuring are 
not suffi cient to ensure sustainable access to infrastructure services by the poor, particularly 
the urban poor. One of the recent estimates suggests that in the city of Dhaka only 2% slum 
dwellers and squatters enjoy the water and sewerage connection facilities provided by Dhaka 
Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (DWASA)1. The Government Score Card Survey of 
the World Bank (2002) noted less than 20% satisfaction of the city dwellers in respect of 
electricity supply and transport facilities. 
There is a tendency among the policy actors in Bangladesh to attribute the inadequacy 
of infrastructure services and their skewed distribution to rapid urbanization and resource 
constraints of the government. However, the relevant literature shows that governance failure, 
in particular corruption outweighs all other factors in obstructing the delivery of infrastructure 
services in Bangladesh. Only a small portion of the resources spent in this sector has been 
properly utilized. It has been further seen that though the volume of infrastructure service 
delivery has expanded in recent years in response to the needs of the vastly increased urban 
population, it has benefi ted mostly those who have already accessed services rather than 
those who have not. 
In view of the above the whole gamut of corruption/governance failure in relation to poorer 
people’s inaccessibility to infrastructure services has been conceptualized in the present 
study as under:
1 Kamal Siddique (2004), Megacity Governance in South Asia
2As evident from the stated framework, a plurality of institutions, lack of appropriate legislation 
and regulation and a top-down provider-recipient service delivery mechanism whereby the urban 
poor are conceived merely as ‘governed’ rather than as active partners in governing their own 
business are some factors which have weakened the accountability arrangements in the delivery 
of infrastructure services. There are now about 40 government / parastatal organizations providing 
various infrastructural services to the city dwellers. These are the Dhaka City Corporation (DCC), 
Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority (DWASA), Dhaka Electric Supply Company Limited (DESCO), 
Dhaka Electricity Supply Authority (DESA), Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakhya (RAJUK), Housing 
and Settlement Directorate (H & SD), Roads and Highways Department (R & HD), Titas Gas 
Transmission and Distribution Company Limited, Department of Social Welfare, Health Directorate 
and so on. Besides, a good number of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are operating in the city. 
One of the studies conducted by Kamal Siddiqui and others in 2000 enlisted 60 non-government 
organizations (NGOs) and 1830 community based organizations (CBOs) in the city. Moreover, there 
are purely voluntary and informal service-providing efforts like garbage collection, traffi c control, or 
informal trial. Thus, there has been an overcrowding of service providing organizations in the city. 
Now the problem is that these organizations operate in isolation from one another and as such 
there is little coordination among them.
Again, there is a multiplicity of policy instruments to regulate the activities of these service-
providing agencies. There are some constitutional bodies together with a few centrally produced 
laws and regulations to ensure the transparency and accountability of these organizations. The 
Comptroller and Auditor General, the Ombudsman, the Election Commission, the Administrative 
Tribunals, the Public Accounts Committee, and the judiciary are these constitutional bodies. Of the 
rules and regulations now in operation the recently enacted ‘Anti-corruption Act 2004’ and ‘Public 
Procurement Regulation 2003’ are worth mention. Besides, there are specifi c laws and regulations 
for each of the service providing organizations such as the DCC ordinance 1983, the DWASA 
Figure 1.1. Conceptual Framework
3ordinance 1963 and 1996, the foreign donations regulation ordinance 1978, the foreign contribution 
ordinance 1982, the government servants rules 1979 and 1985 and so on. Ironically, none of these 
regulations has any specifi c mandate to provide the poor with the basic services. Even there is no 
scope for any consultation with the citizens and experts in the laws. Moreover, there is an overlap 
of functions of the service providing organizations and their respective power and authority is not 
always clear. Amid these policy controversies a hierarchical top-down service delivery system is in 
place that admits of no scope for people’s participation. As this set-up is unable to meet the needs 
and aspirations of poor people a customary delivery mechanism has grown side by side.
Thus, an overlap of policies and service delivery institutions and lack of appropriate policies 
together with lack of participation of the urban poor in the delivery system have together made the 
decision-making process intransparent and effective monitoring diffi cult. Lack of accountability and 
transparency in service delivery is therefore leading to corruption and eventually to the exclusion of 
a large section of the urban poor from the infrastructure service net. 
With this broad understanding of corruption and poor people’s inaccessibility to infrastructural services 
the present case study has attempted to look into the issue of accountability in the infrastructure 
service delivery mechanisms. The objective of the study is to gain a clear understanding about 
effective interventions for service delivery improvement for poor urban communities. In doing so, 
the study has sought to fi gure out the magnitude of urban poverty, map out the needs and priorities 
of the urban poor in terms of service delivery, and analyze the structure and functions of institutions 
working in this area.
1.2  Purpose of the study
The purpose of the study is to improve governance through appropriate accountability arrangements 
for combating corruption in the delivery of infrastructure services (such as water supply, sanitation, 
electricity, drainage, access to roads and paving, solid waste management, and electricity and 
street lighting) in Dhaka city leading to an improvement of the livelihoods of the poor. 
1.3  Research questions
What are the causes of corruption in infrastructure service delivery (water supply, 
sanitation, electricity and street lighting, drainage, access roads and paving and solid waste 
management)?
What are the effects of corruption in infrastructure service delivery on the livelihoods of the 
poor?
What are the accountability arrangements for infrastructure service delivery? How do the 
instituted reforms tackle the issues of corruption through increased accountability? How do the 
accountability arrangements promote pro-poor service delivery and how do they work within the 
context of poor communities? 
What anti-corruption reforms (formal or informal/private sector, NGOs or public sector) have been 
undertaken in parallel sectors such as water and sanitation? What is the scope to ‘transplant’ any 
successful accountability arrangements into the infrastructure sector? If so, how? What general 
lessons can be learnt from these anti-corruption reforms in parallel sectors for the infrastructure 
sector? 
How do social actions create service providers’ accountability and improve pro-poor services?
•
•
•
•
•
41.4  Methodology and Process
A combination of both qualitative and quantitative approaches have been adopted in the study. 
Under this framework information has been collected both from primary and secondary levels. 
Primary Level 
Primary level information has been obtained through a series of discussion with three different 
stakeholder levels, i.e. service providers, service recipients, and policy level actors/experts/ 
professionals. The diagram below shows the levels for primary information collection under the 
study:
Figure 1.2. Levels of Primary Information Collection
Secondary Level
Secondary information for the study has been mainly collected from literature (books, research 
reports, journals etc.), Internet and newspapers.
1.4.1  Processes
The case study and literature review methods specially employed by the study have been supported 
by a variety of tools and techniques including semi-structured interviews, informal discussions, focus 
group discussion (FGD), structured questionnaire and checklists. The semi-structured interviews/ 
informal discussions were conducted at the different institutional levels, while the questionnaire-led 
structured interviews and the FGDs guided by checklists were administered at the service recipient 
level. Besides, to understand the role of civil society actors, the consultation method has been used 
in the study. The following table may give a clearer idea of the various tools and techniques used 
to obtain information.
Table 1.1. Stakeholder levels and relative tools and techniques
Primary-level Stakeholders Tools and Techniques
State level service providers Semi-structured interview / informal discussion (10)
Civil society level service providers Semi-structured interview / informal discussion (5)
State level policy actors Informal discussion / consultation (12)
Civil society level policy actors Informal discussion / consultation (8)
Service recipients Structured interview (225 households) & FGD (6)
Five Levels Total: 266
51.4.2  Selection of the Study Locale
Since the study intended to understand the implications of corruption in infrastructure service 
delivery for the urban poor community of Bangladesh it was decided to conduct a household survey 
under the study. Obviously, Dhaka, the capital city of the country, has the highest concentration of 
infrastructure service delivery. So, the survey has been conducted within this city. According to the 
Bangladesh Population Census 2001, Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) has an area of 360 sq. km 
including an estimated 2004 population of 7.5 million. The assumed annual increase rate of the 
population is 6% only. The same fi gure has been considered here for 2005, since there are constant 
debates on the rate of change of the DCC’s population. The problem is that there has not been any 
BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics) survey of the poverty of Dhaka city. Moreover, there are 
different perceptions of urban poverty in Bangladesh. The BBS estimate 1999-2000 recorded 43% 
urban poverty in the country. 
Again, the Planning Commission using the BBS Household Expenditure Survey 2000 for its Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (ERD, 2003) has estimated the incidence of urban poverty at 36.6 % 
while the most comprehensive survey of urban poverty led by the Center for Urban Studies (CUS) 
in 1996 showed a higher incidence of poverty in Dhaka City, that is, 52 %. Considering these 
controversies on the incidence of urban poverty, especially poverty in Dhaka, the present study 
thought it safe to accept a midpoint fi gure of around 45 % poverty that the Urban Poverty Reduction 
Project (UPRP) of CUS also used in their study in 1996. In this estimate, Dhaka’s poverty now 
stands at 3.37 million in terms of population.
Of the estimated 3.37 million people almost 47.5% live in the slums and squatter settlements. 
According to the above estimate the slum population of the city now stands at more than 1.5 
million. Nevertheless, the fi eld survey by CUS for the UPRP study recorded a sum total of 112669 
households within the DCC slum settlements against a population size of 1104600 in the year 1996. 
That means each household consists of approximately 10 members. According to this household 
size there will be approximately 150000 households now living in the DCC slum settlements. The 
rest of the poor are living in mixed income areas i.e. lower, lower middle and middle-income milieus. 
A large number of them such as household workers, drivers and security guards live as part of the 
middle class or upper class households. As it was not possible to cover these types of the poor, the 
Map I. Showing the Country Location
6present survey has been conducted at Korail, one of the slum locations of the city. The reasons for 
selecting the Korail slum for the survey are as under:
Korail is one of the largest slums in Dhaka city with an estimated area of 90 acres. Its population is 
now estimated at approximately 85,000-90,000 representing 15000 households. Considering the 
household count, which is more than 10% of the total households living in the slum settlements, 
it can easily be presumed that Korail is representative in all respects.
In relation to the other slums of the city the Korail slum is a little different in that it gets almost all 
the infrastructure related services which are mostly absent in the rest of the slum locations. It is 
quite an old slum as it came into being in 1975.
The slum is situated almost at the heart of the city as well as inside one of the city’s most posh 
areas, that is, Gulshan - Banani.
Because of its location on land owned by the state telephone board, the population here has 
been mixed up with the lower ranking telephone board employees. 
In this backdrop, it can be said that the selection of the Korail slum for the present study is quite 
rational. 
•
•
•
•
Map II. Location of the Korail Slum in Dhaka City
71.4.3  Determination of the sample size
To determine the sample size, the study team fi rst conducted a four-day transact-walk at the Korail
slum and collected the following information:
The slum was divided into two units i.e. unit number 1 and unit number 2;
Both the units were almost equal in length;
Both of the units were again divided into two smaller units i.e. the north and the south;
There was an equal distribution of population between unit number 1 and unit number 2; and
Unit number 1 was found to have more concentration of infrastructure related services than the 
other unit. 
In consideration of the stated features of the slum the team decided to conduct the survey in unit 
number 1 dividing it into three clusters i.e. the front cluster, the middle cluster and the last cluster 
as it was not possible to conduct a comprehensive survey due to time constraints. Besides, it was 
thought that there must be the highest and the lowest concentration of services amongst these 
three clusters. As a second option, considering the north and south divisions under the units each 
of the clusters was again divided into two strata i.e. the south strata and the north strata. Thus, a 
total of six strata were identifi ed in the study location. 
Then, a quick participatory rapid appraisal (PRA) census was conducted in the study location 
including all its clusters and strata. Thus, a total of 598 households were identifi ed within the study 
location. It should be mentioned in this connection that the households identifi ed under the north 
strata were found to have almost no infrastructure service delivery. It is in this context that the team 
fi nally decided to conduct the survey within the households identifi ed under the south strata only. 
Thus, fi nally 300 households were selected for conducting the survey under the study.
Along the way it became further noticeable that the households identifi ed under the south strata mostly 
included the house owners though there remained a few tenants within each of the households. 
In view of this, the number of household counts was then multiplied by three with the assumption 
that each households had on an average at least two tenants. Thus, a total of 900 households 
were found in the study location. Finally, applying a systematic random sampling method, 225 
households were selected for the study for conducting the survey. That means, in a systematic 
order every fourth household was surveyed under the study including two of its tenants. 
1.5  Basic Infrastructure Services at the Study Locale
On a national scale, development policies during the 1950s and midway through the 1960s 
emphasized improving the physical infrastructure (roads, railways etc.). However, during the 1970s 
the focus shifted when more importance was given to the infrastructure provisions due to the high 
incidence of poverty and increased pressure from the donor community. Since the 1990s a service-
oriented approach to infrastructure development is in place. Its main features are: 1) creating 
enabling environments, 2) building institutional and human capacities, 3) enhancing access to 
services, and/or 4) enhancing physical capital stock. A brief summary of six infrastructural services 
reviewed under the study showing the real status of the service-oriented approach to infrastructure 
development is given below.
Water
Before 2002, especially before the signing of a contract between Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage 
Authority (DWASA) and some civil society organizations (CSOs) such as Water Aid, DSK, there 
was no scope for the Korail dwellers to get drinking water from DWASA. From 2002 they have been 
getting a supply of water from a reservoir constructed in the slum with the assistance of the NGOs 
•
•
•
•
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8working in the area. Currently, the majority of people have access to supply water but very few of 
them are satisfi ed with the service. Only 12% expressed their satisfaction in terms of access level 
and the remaining 88% expressed their dissatisfaction with the quantity and quality of the service. 
The underlying causes of their dissatisfaction are the irregularity in water supply and the corruption 
of DWASA employees. Illegal connections are reportedly provided very often and those who have 
a legal claim to a regular supply of water are denied their due shares. 
Sanitation
Almost all CSOs working in the community have sanitation programs. So, the scenario of poor 
people’s access to sanitary latrines is relatively better in the community though it is yet to reach 
an acceptable standard in view of the global and national commitments on the issue. Only 26.70% 
respondents expressed their satisfaction with the sanitary latrine facilities. Among those who have 
expressed their satisfaction there are more house owners (48%) than tenants (12%). 
Electricity and Street Lighting
It is only in 2003 that the Korail slum came under the electricity coverage provided by the Dhaka 
Electric Supply Company (DESCO) on condition that groups of consumers would be formed by 
the civil society organizations working there. Survey data show that although 85.3% households 
currently have access to electricity and street lighting services and 81.3% use them in a real sense, 
only 7.1% (6% house owners and 9.3% tenants) are satisfi ed with the existing services. High prices 
were reported as the major cause for dissatisfaction. Reality check further shows that instead of 
the residential rate of electricity the commercial rate is charged to the slum dwellers which is more 
than double the former. Besides, fewer electricity meters than required have been provided there 
and that without the relevant accessories (electric post, cable connection etc.). Moreover, a single 
electricity meter connection costs taka 30 to 40 thousand. This is incredibly higher than the legal 
charge of a meter connection and the amount has to be distributed to a range of staff and engineers 
of the electric company.
Roads and Paving
There are two east-west lying pucca (herringbone) roads within the Korail slum and there are 
some south-north lying narrow dirt passages. As reported by the slum dwellers, they themselves 
constructed the pucca roads by raising a fund from the community as once it became virtually 
impossible for them to move out of home. Despite this, only 12% survey respondents have 
expressed their satisfaction with the communication facilities. 
Drainage
There are some unstructured water passing facilities in the community and only 12.4% have 
expressed their satisfaction with that. More tenants (15%) than house owners (9%) are satisfi ed 
with these facilities. But, these water-passing facilities can in no way be compared to that of a 
drainage system in the true sense of the term. Digging mud at about 8 to 10 inches they have been 
constructed and all are overfl owing with household wastes. Slum dwellers reported that fi nding no 
alternative to disposing liquid household wastes they themselves had constructed these.  
Solid Waste Management
Regarding solid waste management 23% respondents have expressed their satisfaction including 
28% house owners and 20% tenants. Qualitative information suggests that slum dwellers mostly 
dump their household wastes into the lake surrounding the slum. On the entry side a few handcarts 
are ready to carry away household wastes for the relatively wealthy people. This has been arranged 
by their own initiatives and fi nance. 
9In view of the persistent dissatisfaction with the delivery of the stated six infrastructure services, the 
study team talked to the local representatives of the Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) who reported 
that the slum was on illegal land holdings and could be demolished any time. In order to legally 
obtain infrastructure services a holding number for an occupant is a must. Now, to obtain a holding 
number an occupant needs to have a structured house. But slum dwellers are not in a position to 
get the permission for a building or construction. So, it is very diffi cult on the part of the local DCC 
representatives to provide infrastructure services to the slum dwellers, as long as the legal tenurial 
security is absent there.
1.6  Demographic attributes
The basic infrastructure services of the study locale have been depicted above in brief. In this 
section a few demographic attributes of the study locale would be discussed so as to understand 
the relationships amongst poverty, accountability arrangements, access to basic infrastructure 
services and corruption more clearly. 
1.6.1  Household Size and Sex
In total 225 households have been surveyed under the study and these include 33.3% house 
owners’ households and 66.7% tenants’ households. On an average 5 family members have been 
recorded in the house owners category households and 3.8 members in the tenants category 
households. Amongst the household members 51.5% are male and 50.5% are female. In the house 
owners category households 53.9% are male and 46.1% are female. In the tenants category the 
male-female ratio is fi fty-fi fty.
Table 1.2. Distribution of Sample and Gender Composition (% of Households)
Sex House Owner Tenant Total
Male 53.9 50.0 51.5
Female 46.1 50.0 50.5
Total (N) 375 564 939
1.6.2  Religion
Two religious categories have been found in the survey households. Among them 99.1% are Muslim 
households and 0.9% Hindu households as illustrated in the following table; 
Table 1.3. Religion of the Respondents (% of Households)
Religion House Owner Tenant Total
Muslim 98.67 99.33 99.1
Hindu 1.33 0.67 0.9
Total (N) 75 150 225 
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1.6.3  Marital Status of Households Members
Amongst the household members 50.3% are married and 46.8% are unmarried. 
Table 1.4. Marital Status of the Household Members (% of Households)
Marital Status House owner Tenant Total
Married 49.6 50.7 50.3
Divorced 1.3 .7 0.9
Separated .3 .9 0.6
Widow or widower 1.3 1.4 1.4
Never Married 47.5 46.3 46.8
Total (N) 375 564 939
1.6.4 Educational Status
Figure 1.3. Educational status of the household members (% of Households)
As evident in the fi gure, the highest number of the household members are primary graduates 
(31.3%). Of them 30.1% belong to the house owners category and 32.1% to the tenants category. 
The second highest segment of the household members as reported are illiterate (26.9%). More 
tenant household members (32.3%) are illiterate than the members of the house owners category 
(18.9%). Another 23.7% household members reportedly know either the alphabet or can sign only. 
Amongst others 11.9% reported to have studied up to the secondary level and the rest either 
completed the secondary course or studied more. However, they are very insignifi cant in number.
1.6.5  Sources of Livelihood
Self-employment in micro settings in the forms of grocery shops, tea stalls, workshops etc is the 
highest occupation category in the study locale. 26.7% house owners and 38.7% tenants reported 
this (Table 1.5). In the rest of the cases there are great variations of occupation between house 
owners and tenants. House owners in general are found to be in professions like house renting 
(22.67%), small business (12%), and lower status jobs (20%) whereas, tenants are mostly engaged 
in day laboring (15.2%) and rickshaw/van pulling (30.7%). 
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Table 1.5. Sources of Livelihood of the Respondents (% of Households)
Sources of Livelihood House owner Tenant
1. Micro-enterprise/self employed 26.67 -
2. Labourer 2.67 -
3. Agriculture - -
4. Migration - -
5. Rent 22.67 -
6. Saving/remittances/pension - 0.67
7. NGO - -
8. Small business 12.00 2.00
9. Low status job 20.00 12.67
10. Other (Rickshaw pulling, Van pulling) 16.00 30.67
Total (N) 75 150
Moreover, the majority of the survey households are found to have either a secondary or a tertiary 
occupation. In the case of house owners (56.92%) renting out their houses is the highest-ranking 
secondary occupation whereas for tenants it is rickshaw puling (30.67%).
1.6.6  Important Social Groups
As reported by the slum dwellers, there are at least three infl uential social groups within the study 
location i.e., people affi liated with the ruling party, people affi liated with the opposition party and 
the house owners. However, those who are affi liated with the ruling party are more infl uential than 
others.
1.6.7 Income Status
33.3% house owners have more than taka 6001+ monthly income, 30.67% earn taka 4500 to 6000, 
21.3% earn taka 3001 to 4500 and another 12% have only taka 2001 to 3000 income a month. 
Amongst the tenants 42.67% have a monthly income of taka 3001 to 4500 only. Amongst others 
28% earn taka 2001 to 3000, 10.67% earn either taka 2001 to 3000 or taka 4501 to 6000, 6.67% 
have taka 6001+ earnings and 1.33% have less than taka 1000 income a month. The fi gure below 
deals with the income data of the studied households:
Figure 1.4. Income Status of the Studied Households (% of Households)
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1.7  Institutions in Connection to Service Delivery in the Study Locale
The study location gets infrastructure support and services from the following institutions:
Table 1.6. Service-Providing Institutions in the Study Location
Institutions Services
Year
Started 
Dhaka City Corporation 
(DCC)
Solid waste management, street lighting, 
drainage, sanitation, roads and paving, 
awareness building
1983
Dhaka Water Supply 
and Sewerage Authority 
(DWASA)
Water supply, sewerage and drainage, 
awareness building
2003
Dhaka Electric Supply 
Company (DESCO)
Electricity 2002
PROSHIKA
Sanitation, water, primary health care, 
education, housing, awareness building, 
policy advocacy
1989
Coalition for the Urban Poor 
(CUP)
Sanitation, water, primary health care, 
awareness building, policy advocacy
1990
Dushtha Shasthya Kendra 
(DSK)
Sanitation, health, water, awareness 
building, policy advocacy
1989
1.7.1  DCC
It is the only local government institution functioning in the city. The DCC Ordinance 1983 and 
its subsequent amendments provide the existing legal framework for this institution. Initially, it 
was responsible for all essential service delivery to the city dwellers. With the establishment of 
a few semi-autonomous service providing organizations over the years like DWASA, DESCO, 
RAJUK, Roads and Highways Department and so on, majority of its important services have been 
transferred to these institutions. Of the six infrastructure services covered under the study only solid 
waste management is now DCC’s sole responsibility. Besides, it has partial responsibility for street 
lighting, drainage, sanitation and roads and paving. 
1.7.2  DWASA
The DWASA Ordinance 1963 laid down the foundation for DWASA. With the last amendments of 
1996, it is now functionally responsible to build, operate, and maintain necessary infrastructures 
for the proper supply of water, for treatment and safe disposal of sewerage and for removing water 
logging from the city.
1.7.3  DESCO
With the status of a public limited company DESCO fi rst came into being in November 1996 but 
formally started functioning in 1998. Functionally, it is responsible to provide electricity services 
within Dhaka city. It has no electricity producing capacity. Purchasing electricity from the Power 
Development Board (PDB) and the Dhaka Electric Supply Authority (DESA) DESCO sell that to the 
city dwellers. Because of its company status, it pays no special attention to the electricity needs of 
the poor city dwellers.
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1.7.4  PROSHIKA
PROSHIKA’s urban Poor Development Program (UPDP) initiated in 1989 is a milestone in 
addressing urban poverty. Under this program a number of support service initiatives were 
administered at different slums and squatter settlements of Dhaka city. Of them formation of primary 
groups, federations and community based organizations CBOS), providing of latrines, tube-wells, 
development education, launching of awareness-building programs are worth mentioning. During 
the recent past PROSHIKA’s service delivery to the Korail slum found to have been reduced 
remarkably. An uncongenial atmosphere resulting from the present government’s attitude towards 
PROSHIKA has reportedly caused this.
1.7.5  CUP
In view of massive slum demolition in the late 1980s, the civil society organizations were then 
working with the urban poor of Dhaka jointly formed the Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP) in 1990. 
At the initial stage CUP concentrated on deliberate advocacy campaigns (meeting policy-makers, 
holding press conferences and staging protests) to infl uence policy-makers on the issue of better 
service delivery towards the poor of the city. Gradually, its activities increased with the inclusion of 
service delivery programs in the slums and squatters where poor people live in. In the Korail slum 
it is now providing sanitation, primary health care and education services besides its regular policy 
advocacy and awareness building programs.
1.7.6  DSK
DSK was established to address the health care needs of the slum dwellers following the devastating 
fl oods of 1988. Now-a-days, DSK program interventions in the slum locations include amongst 
others health care, water supply, sanitation, micro-fi nance, and education. Its water supply program 
again involves a community-based approach in which communities are allowed to participate in 
designing water points, selecting site locations, and formulating guidelines on water use and cost 
sharing. 
1.8  Organization of the Report
The present report is organized into six main sections. In the fi rst section the study rationale has 
been discussed in detail. In doing so a detailed methodology as well as a brief overview of the 
different infl uential factors in relation to the study theme has been incorporated. The second section 
contains a literature review on corruption. The third section of the report deals with the forms and 
stages of infrastructure service delivery. The fourth section provides analyses of the causes and 
effects of corruption in the service delivery mechanisms in line with accountability arrangements. In 
the fi fth section a critical analysis has been made of the corruption combating strategies adopted so 
far in the infrastructure service sectors. The necessity of strengthening accountability arrangements 
in service sectors in light of analyzing the impact of corruption on the poorer communities has 
been considered in the fourth section of the report. Finally, there has been an attempt to present 
a detailed framework for combating corruption in the service sectors emphasizing accountability 
matters. 
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2 This understanding neglects the role of private individuals in corruption; overlooks the imperfect (immoral) market 
situation of the country; denies the motive and powers involved in paying bribe for securing rights (Wood, 1994).
2. Literature review
2.1  Introduction
Although corruption is an age-old problem, it is only in the recent years that this problem has 
become a major concern in both developed and developing countries. Because of its open 
and pervasive forms corruption received global attention during the last decade and even 
topped the international agenda. OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention of 1999 best refl ects the 
global concern about the problem. Concern about corruption is also running high in policy 
circles and civil society in Bangladesh as the country has topped the list of corrupt countries 
for the fi fth time as per Transparency International ranking. 
In spite of this growing concern about corruption there is a paucity of empirical research on 
the issue in Bangladesh. There is even more paucity of research of corruption in infrastructure 
service delivery. The very few empirical researches on corruption that deserve mention 
have been conducted within a predetermined macro framework and mostly the degree and 
trends of corruption nationwide have been considered there. Besides, there have been some 
initiatives to scrutinize media reporting on corruption and thereby to determine its increasing 
or decreasing trends. Thus, the special features of corruption in the micro context, particularly 
its impact on the lives of the urban poor have been simply overlooked or negatively assessed 
or even misunderstood. 
2.2  Understanding Corruption
2.2.1  By Defi nition
The understanding of corruption in Bangladesh is found to vary from person to person, 
professional to professional. In the words of Iftekharuzzaman, executive director, TIB, 
“corruption is a behavior or act that breaks away from or contradicts ethical and moral 
standard, traditions, laws and civic virtues (2005)”. Economists in general seem to perceive it 
as illegal economic exchange (Raihan, 2000). Public Administration practitioners are prone to 
view it as a bureaucratic dysfunction that hinders administrative effi ciency. Sociologists of the 
country perceive it as a process which involves social, economic or political exchange and 
which often occurs in an institutionalized form (Zakiuddin, 2000). Summarizing all these it can 
be said that corruption in general projects a negative image of the bureaucrats, professionals 
and businesspeople of the country and is unacceptable to society (ibid). 
This study views corruption as ‘the misuse of public power for private profi t’ in line with the 
current development discourse (WDR, 1997 & ADB, 1999) although such an understanding 
is not altogether free from debates2. However, in Bangladesh there are ambiguities in 
ascertaining the degree of corruption. Hossain (1990) sees ‘no difference between coming 
habitually late to work, receiving gifts, keeping people in power ‘in good humor’ or committing 
a corrupt act’. 
It has been pointed out that in Bangladesh corruption is grounded on a social formation 
where social processes, structures, institutions, modes of exchange etc. all have contributory 
effects on the present day proliferation of corruption (ibid). Based on this argument different 
typologies of corruption found in the literature has been considered in brief in the following 
section.
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2.2.2  Analyzing typologies
There is a great variety of corruption typologies and forms in the works of different professionals 
in Bangladesh. In general, they fall into two broader categories i.e. grand corruption, and petty 
corruption. Petty corruption is most pervasive in society and harms the poor most. It is a complex, 
morally ambiguous and intractable issue often connected to higher levels of systematic and 
systemic corruption (Riley, 1999). TIB report card survey 2005 on health services in Rajshahi area 
in Bangladesh revealed that patients are victims of 13 types of petty corruption in the forms of 
bribes, which include: unauthorized payment for bed allocation, using trolleys, getting supplies like 
saline, bandage materials, food from the canteen, medicine from the hospital pharmacy etc.
Raihan (2000) borrowing from Shleifer and Vishny (1993) has distinguished between ‘corruption 
without theft’ and, ‘corruption with theft’. Corruption without theft encompasses bribe demands of 
the offi cials in addition to the regular payment of the government while corruption with theft involves 
instances where the regular payment is not made to the government. In the ‘Transparency International 
Bangladesh’s baseline survey on corruption, phase two’ (1997) there is a supplementation of these 
two types of corruption. The survey shows that sixty-percent urban households are to pay either 
money or to exert infl uence in other ways to get water line connections and to correct water bills in 
addition to the legal payment. The report also says that nearly one-third of the urban households 
have got their water bills reduced through an arrangement with the meter readers. 
Wood’s (1994) classifi cation of corruption in the Bangladesh context is however bias towards 
Michael Beenstock’s (in Raihan, 2000) classifi cation i.e. extortionary, subversive and benign 
corruption based on the consideration of market imperfections and illegality or secrecy. Benign 
corruption does not refl ect market imperfections, e.g., the low-paid bureaucrats earn commissions 
through corruption that competitively determines the supply price for their services (Wood, 1994). 
On the other hand, extortionary and subversive corruption causes market imperfections in addition 
to illegal doings as it involves the exercise of monopoly power to receive a bribe as well as facilitate 
unequal exchange of benefi t to the bribe payers.
2.2.3  Underlying corruption perceptions
In the developed country literature there is a consistent trend to perceive Bangladesh’s corruption 
in light of a school of thought commonly known as ‘modernization theories’ which postulate that 
the industrialized world has reached its present stage of development by adopting a particular 
form of liberal-democracy and state polity. Now in order to attain the same growth, Bangladesh 
must go through the historical stages of abandoning ‘traditional’ norms that encourage patronage, 
patron-client relationships, patrimonial affi liations, all of which retard the process of development. 
Although, the poverty, social deprivation and individual forms of organization existing in the country 
have been recognized in the modernization theories but they link them to a particular cultural 
condition which includes the backward traits of people and a propensity to be corrupt (Novak, 1994 
and Maloney 1991).  
In contrast to the above, there are continuous attempts on the part of the national experts to postulate 
the issue of corruption as an imported capitalist product (Chowdhury, 1983; Bhattacharya, 1994; 
Chowdhury, 1985; Umar, 1994). Corruption is perceived to be the end result of an outside, essentially 
alien infl uence. It is not something indigenous and certainly, its presence does not refl ect the true 
cultural heritage of the people of this country. TI Chairman, Peter Eigen in 1997 commented that a 
large share of corruption in Bangladesh is the product of multinational corporations headquartered 
in leading industrialized countries, using bribery and kick-backs to buy contracts.
Apart from the above, there are some who try to perceive corruption locating the issue within 
the nation context. According to this view, Bangladesh has a signifi cantly different context which 
include amongst others: extended socio-economic and political conditions of poverty and social 
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cleavages, large incidence of corruption in terms both area coverage and magnitude, and a negative 
understanding of corruption (Zakiuddin, 2000). Wood (1994) noted that Bangladesh is a weak state 
and by defi nition poor. The state is to cope with severe socio-economic and political pressures 
amongst which scarcity of resources and the unstable political situation are the most common 
ones. Besides, it has an imperfect market, which is unable to discharge its responsibility. In such 
a situation the state is to play a major role in the market. More specifi cally, here transactions in the 
market place actually happen in between the state and its clients. The ultimate result has been 
immoral activities on the part of the state in terms of both public resources and public expenditure 
allocation. Taking the advantage of its fragmented social structures and codes public services are 
managed in absolute rent seeking conditions (Wood, 1994).
Furthermore, corruption here is often perceives to be linked to politics. In reality, political infl uence 
continues to play a vital role in all spheres of life in Bangladesh and politics is usually considered 
a breeding ground of corruption. Politics is so permeated by graft that a political leader who is not 
perceived to be corrupt is usually pushed to the background. The works of Jahan (1980), Novak 
(1994), Maudud (1983) and Muhith (1991) are all replete with the theme of political corruption that 
has taken place in Bangladesh in different regimes.
2.3  Trends 
There are different trends of corruption in the relevant literature. For a better understanding, the 
trends can be put into the following three categories.
2.3.1  Cultural and political patronage
For most of the writers corruption is an indigenously created condition in Bangladesh. Patronage, 
patron-client relationships, factional and patrimonial arrangements are the traditional processes 
through which resources are mainly distributed and allocated in Bangladesh.  Anti-corruption in 
Bangladesh: A UNDP case study, drafted by Hitomi Oikawa (2003) display these characteristics. 
As noted by Theobald (1990, p.56) in the past there was a kind of cultural patronage based on 
kinship networking, gender bias, religious bias and a kind of political patronage based on selective 
appointments in the country.
2.3.2  Economic exchange
With the onset of colonialism in the country corruption became a kind of economic exchange 
between the parties involved. Treisman’s (1999) investigation fi nds a correlation between colonialism 
and corruption. Very often it has been articulated that the East India Company, which effectively 
seized power in Bengal in 1757, perpetuated a highly corrupt system, paying its employees sub-
subsistence wages, thereby compelling them to resort to private business and extortion (Mollah 
and Uddin, undated). Robert Clive described the employees of the company as “a set of men 
whose sense of honor and duty to their employers had been estranged by the larger pursuit of their 
own immediate advantages”.
2.3.3  Corporate culture
With the trade liberalization aspect of globalization particularly in the 1980s corruption has become 
a part of the corporate culture. ‘Private gain misusing public offi ces’ has gradually come to be 
accepted as the form of corruption. It has been perceived as an inevitable suffering of the vulnerable 
in the interest of growth. 
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2.4  Causes of corruption
There are so many complex causes of corruption in the available literature that it is impossible to 
make a comprehensive account of all of them in the present study. An attempt has been made 
below to consider the major causes of corruption categorizing them into a few broader groups.
2.4.1  Governance failure
There is persistent reputation that weak governance characterized by a lack of transparency, 
accountability, and rule of law are inextricably linked to corruption and are mutually reinforcing. One 
of the World Bank survey (2002b) has found that purchasing electricity and water costs the poor city 
dwellers of Bangladesh two to three times more than their more affl uent counterparts. The report 
has cited this as an example of the inevitable consequences of poor governance and systematic 
ineffi ciencies. Poor people cannot build resistance against this. They cannot even complain, since 
complaining may result in loosing services altogether. Ahmed and his associates (2004) notes that 
in Bangladesh corruption is largely the outcome of a deviant bureaucratic behavior in a decadent 
system in which loyalty and subordination are valued more than professionalism.
When the Bangladeshi government audits expenditures, there are few instances of follow-up 
actions. The public accounts committee does not function. There is an attitude that if an offi cial 
spends government money illegally today it will be audited 10-12 years later. So, they are sure that 
they do not have to face any punishment right now (ibid). 
2.4.2  Political reasons
The political reasons of corruption are also widely noticeable in the corruption literature. Because of 
growing perceptions of political corruption in Bangladesh, before the latest national election almost 
all the political parties incorporated corruption-combating strategies in their election manifestos. 
The ruling BNP during the 2001 national election pledged a number of high priority specifi c actions 
for uprooting corruption which mainly included appointment of ombudsman, establishment of an 
independent anti-corruption commission, establishing transparency and accountability in sales and 
procurement of public and government controlled institutions, controlling the abuse of infl uence, and 
publishing accounts of the wealth of the prime minister, ministers and all individuals of equivalent 
status including people’s representatives (Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Election Manifesto: 
National Election 2001, p.12.).
The Awami League (the opposition party) also attached a high priority to fi ghting corruption 
for fulfi lling its commitment to establish good governance and a pro-people administration that 
would be transparent, effi cient, honest, and accountable to the people. It promised to set-up an 
‘Anti-corruption Council’ aimed at eliminating corruption and setting up an effective institutional 
mechanism. (Bangladesh Awami League, Election Manifesto 2001, p.14).
2.4.3  Absence of competition 
There is a general notion persisting in the literature that it is because of the less competitive market 
environment that the incidence of corruption is very high in the country. Competition is commonly 
assumed to lower the rent seeking scope of both public servants and politicians (Irwin and Brook, 
2003). 
2.4.4  Cultural Determinants 
The socio-cultural aspects of corruption are important for a better understanding of this problem 
(Zakiuddin, 2000). Siddiqui (2000) says, “For a long time in recent past, Bangladesh remained 
under authoritarian rule owing to colonialism and military dictatorship. During this time, concessions 
at the local level were often used to legitimize authoritarian rule at the national level. Even when 
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democracy was ushered in, problems remained owing to patron-client relationships, gender 
discrimination and other drawbacks.” 
Barkat (in News Network, 2003:78) says, “We fought against two economies in 1971, but the 
people once again have fallen into the trap of two economies. A small group of people, may be 
ten lakhs among the country’s 14 crore people, are the real benefi ciaries. So here we have made 
another economy of the distressed and deprived people and the economy of the ten lakh people 
- the real benefi ciaries of the economy - forcing the remaining 13.90 crore people to endure all sorts 
of deprivation and hardship “. In spite of this strong ground, corruption literature in the country in 
general lacks a socio-cultural analysis of corruption. 
2.4.5  Colonialism
Though there is no full-fl edged studies on the impact of colonialism on the level of corruption, 
variables of colonial heritage are often observed to enter as control variables into some studies as 
stated earlier. 
2.5  Effects of corruption/costs of corruption 
Empirical evidence suggests that in Bangladesh, corruption aggravates income inequality and is 
associated with slower economic growth. 
There are again some empirical researches supplementing the stated theoretical propositions. 
Mauro in a cross-section of 67 countries fi nds that corruption negatively impacts on the ratio of 
investment to GDP and argues that if Bangladesh were to improve the integrity of its bureaucracy 
to the level of that of Uruguay, its investment rate would increase by almost fi ve percent of GDP. 
The WB offi cial paper “Corruption in Bangladesh, Costs and Cures”, Presented at the Bangladesh 
Aid Consortium meeting in Paris, 2000 clearly stated that “per capita income in a corruption free 
Bangladesh could have nearly double to US$ 700 instead of US$ 350 refl ects the harmful impact 
of bribery, kick-backs and similar under the table payments on investment levels and misallocated 
resources” (in News Network, 2003a: 56).
Besides, News Network (2003a) in one of its recent papers states that corruption in every sector 
is frustrating the country’s efforts for sustained economic growth and people’s movement out of 
poverty. Nothing seems to move in Bangladesh without the so-called “speed money”. Foreign 
investors and businessmen thus feel discouraged to come to Bangladesh. In another initiative 
it has been found that in Bangladesh, more than 30% of urban household respondents got their 
electric and/or water bills reduced by bribing the meter readers (World Bank, 2002b).
Barkat (2002) in a seminar paper noted that it is due to corruption that the country’s poor people got 
the benefi t of only 25% of the total foreign aid that Bangladesh received during the last 30 years, 
although the assistance was mainly meant for the poor. For him it is the politicians, bureaucrats, 
commission agents, consultants and construction contractors who take away about 30% of the total 
foreign aid. 
In a fi nal attempt, it has been confi rmed that corruption causes human insecurity in the country. 
Iftekharuzzaman (2005) in one of his paper examines the extent to which corruption has become 
a source of human insecurity in Bangladesh and notes how corruption affects almost everyone in 
society though the poor are the easiest victims of bribery, extortion, and intimidation. The poor are 
directly affected by the increasing cost of key public services by way of unauthorized payments, low 
quality of such services and their inadequacy or lack of access to essential services as education, 
health and justice. 
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2.6  Corruption combating strategies
As stated earlier, corruption discourses suggest many measures for combating corruption but 
there are hardly any with an operational and analytical framework. Of the few works that have 
an analytical framework of corruption in the context of Bangladesh Geoffrey Wood (1994:19) is 
quite signifi cant. In his analytical model he proposes to develop a ‘resource profi le’ within the poor 
for combating corruption. This refers to several innovative and indigenously inspired ideas about 
human capital development among the poor, specifi cally of four categories of resources: material, 
human, social and cultural (Wood, 1994, p. 19, 539, 490 and passim). He further suggests that it 
is by strengthening these profi les that the poorer capacity will be developed to a certain level that 
are necessary of accessing the basic services provided by the state. According to him, the poor 
are marginalised and prevented from accessing resources because they lack the stated resources 
(ibid, p. 539). 
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3. Forms and stage of Infrastructure Service Delivery 
This chapter presents the forms and stages of infrastructure services for the urban poor and 
throws light on the providers of specifi c services. It shows how much access the urban poor 
actually get to those services and how they utilize them. It then describes their satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction as well as problems they face in accessing these services and they have 
to pay for the costs. 
3.1  Introduction
Infrastructure services are critical to poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in Bangladesh. Accessing infrastructure services is crucial for 
poor households and of central importance in all kinds of economic activities. The supply 
of basic services has a profound effect on the quality of life. Good infrastructure can lower 
production costs, increase productivity, accelerate economic growth and improve health and 
education outcomes. Bangladesh’s Constitution states that the Government of Bangladesh is 
responsible for creating an environment for its citizens that would allow them to improve the 
quality of their lives through access to health, education and other basic services. However, 
delivering essential infrastructure services effi ciently to meet the needs of users, particularly 
the poorer ones is still a major challenge for Bangladesh. Moreover, the provision of services 
in Dhaka is specially constrained by very fast urban growth as well as governance problems. 
There are severe defi ciencies in both the availability and quality of services, particularly 
for the poor. The delivery systems are complex, ineffi cient and non-transparent with many 
households paying bribes to ensure services (World Bank, 2002a). 
As shown in the fi rst chapter, the basic infrastructure services in the slums are water, sanitation, 
electricity, roads and paving, drainage and solid waste management. However, access to 
health, education, power, water supply, sanitation and waste disposal is very limited for the 
urban poor. Slum dwellers fi nd it very diffi cult to access infrastructure services because many 
service providers do not work there. The services that do exist in the slums are of low quality 
and their costs can be prohibitive. The services are delivered by a mix of Government, NGOs, 
donors and private individuals (mastaans, the musclemen) who often use illegal methods. 
Mastaans facilitate “illegal” connections to essential services like electricity and water, and 
in the process are able to benefi t by diverting resources away from the state. Slums are 
controlled by them and they have different levels of authority and hierarchy. There are the 
local level mastaans who control sections of a slum, and more aggressive mastaans who 
have authority over the lower level leaders of the slum. Both are generally considered to 
be involved in illegal activity such as extortion and violence. They are frequently associated 
with a ruling political party. They organize themselves into gangs/groups and demand money 
from the urban poor who live under their “protection” in their “slum area”. Many mastaans
are reported to have close links with politicians, municipal authorities, and the police in the 
neighborhood. Political parties rely on links with local mastaans for electoral support and re-
election of particular candidates in an area.  A mastaan’s power base is further consolidated 
if the political party he belongs to forms the government. Thus, patronage relationships 
characterize slum politics, which extend from the slum all the way into the local authority and 
political parties. These services are limited, and generally perceived to be of low quality. 
3.2  Forms and stages of Infrastructure Services 
3.2.1  Water supply
The supply of safe water is an essential service with important implications for public health 
in Bangladesh. Although Bangladesh is richly endowed with water resources, potable water 
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and good sanitation are unavailable to many people. Water and sanitation issues represent a major 
health risk and a drain on the economy in terms of time lost and deaths resulting from water-borne 
diseases. Water supply problems are very acute in the urban areas where the public sector has 
been the main service provider. 
At present the main government body that provides water in Dhaka is the Dhaka Water Supply and 
Sewerage Authority (DWASA). DWASA was set up in 1963 to supply pure, safe and dependable 
water to the city dwellers, dispose of sewerage on a regular and continuous basis and collect water 
and sewerage rates from the consumers. Previously, the City Municipal Corporation was responsible 
for these services. DWASA is an autonomous, city level body set up in 1963, and is responsible 
for capital development, production and supply of water, and the operation and maintenance of 
safe and dependable water services in Dhaka city. As per the WASA Act of 1996, the organization 
has been carrying out the responsibility to ensure water supply, dispose of sewerage on a regular 
and continuous basis for the improvement of the hygienic environment of the dwellers of Dhaka 
Metropolitan city and Narayangonj town. Later, the National Policy for Safe Water Supply and 
Sanitation 1998 provided that DWASA be responsible for sustainable water supply (for drinking, 
industrial and commercial use) and sewerage and storm-water drainage systems in the metropolitan 
city (DWASA, 2004).  The policy also stated that DWASA and relevant agencies would support 
and promote any collective initiatives in slums and squatter settlements in accessing water supply 
services on a payment basis. Water is supplied either through a pipeline directly to the households 
or through licensed tube-wells or public taps outside the households. Tube-well arrangements are 
either private and inside the premises of the household or shared and outside the premises in a 
common area.
However, the services provided by the DWASA at present are hardly satisfactory. Moreover, the 
fast growing population of the urban areas in Bangladesh is exceeding the capacity of water supply 
services. Over the years, the water supply situation has not improved much. Nowadays, the DWASA 
water is highly contaminated (even by Pathogenic bacteria) and is not safe for drinking without 
boiling or further treatment by water purifying tablets. The whole water supply system is badly 
managed with a high system loss because of illegal connections and false billing. Only 55 percent 
of the poor households in Dhaka city have access to tap water and only 20 percent of them are 
connected to the waterborne sewerage system (Siddiqui et al 2004). Moreover, for the fast growing 
population of Dhaka city most of the existing water supply services are inadequate to meet demand 
and insuffi ent supply of safe drinking water. As a result, a large number of slum dwellers lack water 
supply, sanitation and hygiene services and are forced to live an inhuman life. Due to constrained 
access, not all households use drinking water from government sources of supply, but use privately 
owned tube-wells, hand pumps, wells, ponds and rivers. Moreover, because of the inadequacy of 
government efforts the private sector and NGOs are increasingly providing small-scale informal 
services to the public in urban fringe areas. The formal service sector is often reluctant to offer its 
services to slum dwellers, who have no legal standing, thus leaving them without basic services 
such as water supply, sanitation, and electricity. In the absence of legal channels through which 
to acquire these services, illegal black-market services have emerged. Slum dwellers are almost 
forced to purchase water from illegal connections at many times the regular rate. To improve this 
situation, Dustha Shasthya Kendra (DSK), a local NGO, began negotiating with DWASA. In 1992 
DWASA gave legal connections to a few slums on condition that any unpaid bills be settled by DSK. 
DSK organised the slum dwellers into water committees responsible for management of water, 
collection of charges, and maintenance and bill payment to DWASA. 
Previously DWASA policy was to make connections only to households who could show the legal 
tenures of their plot. As it is very rare for the inhabitants of Dhaka’s poorest neighbourhoods (such 
as slum dwellers) to have legal tenure, this effectively bars them from offi cial water provision. In 
addition, DWASA had no way of recovering its costs in this type of neighbourhood. By June 2002 
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DSK constructed 97 water points in Dhaka. Slum dwellers in these areas now have access to 
a regular water supply at a much lower rate. The success of such piloting eventually led to the 
involvement of other development partners in the process.  International agencies like WaterAid 
Bangladesh and Plan International and a number of local NGOs such as ASD, ARBAN, PHULKI, 
RHDS joined the process as facilitating agents for benefi ciary communities. A Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) was signed on June, 2005 between DWASA and WaterAid Bangladesh, 
Plan International, Assistance for Slum Dwellers (ASD), Association for the Realization of Basic 
Needs (ARBAN), PHULKI, Rural Health and Development Society (RHDS) for improving access to 
safe water, environmental sanitation and hygienic promotion services, for the urban poor living in 
the slums within DWASA Zone-4 (Mirpur, Pallabi, part of Kafrul and Cantonment area and gradually 
extended to other areas of DWASA) of Dhaka city on an expanded scale and in a coordinated 
way.
3.2.1.1 Access and use
The household survey results of this study show that water is available to the majority of the 
households (Figure 3.1). 100 percent house owners and 98 percent tenants have reported to have 
access to water service and cent percent house owners and 97.33 percent tenant households are 
using water. Three sources of water exist in the Korail slum such as kuya (a ring well/a draw-well) 
water, water supplied by private individuals and tube-well water. Cent percent house owners and 
97.33 percent tenants use the supply water but 2.67 percent tenants use the jhil (a long pool of 
water) water for drinking, bathing and washing purposes. Since there was no government water 
supply available for slum households, cent percent slum dwellers depend upon private sources 
for the supply of drinking water. Consequently, various private arrangements have been made for 
water. NGOs (DSK and others) get connections from DWASA and provide water to people living on 
government land in slums. 
Figure 3.1. Access and use of water service (% of Households)
The survey results and participants of focus group discussions revealed that there were legal 
(through NGOs) and some illegal water supply channels in the slum.  Slum dwellers are aware that 
a ‘holding number’ is required to get a legal water supply connection from the government agencies. 
Since Korail slum does not have any holding number, some households buy water from few the 
households (house owners living there for a long time) that have legal access to water or own 
private tube-wells in their houses and pay charges for water on a monthly basis. There is a water 
reservoir or two and eight - ten illegal water points in the Korail slum. In addition, some infl uential 
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persons and mastaans in the slum are able to obtain illegal water connection in connivance with 
the WASA staff. They applied for water for personal use but after getting permission from DWASA 
they are using the point for business purpose. From these points slum dwellers buy one kolshi of 
water for 1/2 taka which is two/three times costlier than the normal government rate. Most of the 
tenants used jhil water for their washing and bathing and they also dump the garbage in the jhil
which is very unhealthy. So, one can understand the hygiene situation of the slum. Since they do 
not have any other option, they are bound to use contaminated water.  In the different focus group 
discussions participants revealed that the water problem was very acute in the slum. Therefore, 
these households having water connection and tube-wells for personal use have to share the water 
with their neighbours.  
3.2.1.2 Problems with water supply
Respondents- 90.67 percent house owners and 94.67 percent tenants-reported experiencing 
problems in water supply (Figure 3.2). The main problem that households have with the water 
service is irregular and inadequate supply; more than half of all households (66.18 percent house 
owners and 71.13 percent tenants) face this problem (Table 3.1). The focus group with house 
owners and tenants in the slum confi rmed the survey results; they said that they often suffered from 
interruptions in supply and inadequate supply. Supply was the problem slum dwellers mentioned 
most often.   For instance, slum dwellers said that they had a supply of water only twice a day 
and sometimes they had to go without water for 2 to 3 days at a time. Secondly, respondents 
complained about the cost of water. 
Figure 3.2. Faced problems with water supply (% of Households)
In the previous chapter, we have seen that slum dwellers buy one kolshi water for 1/2 taka which is 
two/three times costlier than government rate. Therefore, 30.88 percent house owners and 26.76 
percent tenants identifi ed this as a problem. They also mentioned other problems such as low 
quality service, mismanagement, paying bribe for service etc.       
Table 3.1. Nature/types of problems with water supply (% of Households) 
Nature/types of problem House owner Tenant
Irregular Service delivery 66.18 71.13
High cost 30.88 26.76
Low quality service 1.47 1.70
Mismanagement 1.47 1.41
Total (N) 68 142
25
3.1.2.3 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction
The level of satisfaction with water supply is very low. Among the users of water, only 12 percent of 
the house owners and 12.33 percent tenants indicated that they were satisfi ed with water service 
delivery (Figure 3.3). On the other hand, majority households (88 percent house owner and 87.67 
percent tenants) expressed their dissatisfaction regarding water supply. In the different focus group 
discussions, participants also expressed their dissatisfaction about water. They have mentioned 
that if the government would provide water to them at a low price, they could live a quality life. 
In the absence of public service, they have to pay a high price for water and sometimes it is very 
diffi cult for them to collect water from water points. They have to move between water points for 
collecting water. Even by paying high price they cannot sometimes get suffi cient water. Moreover, 
the supplied water is often full of dirt and unsuitable for drinking. When they complained of this, the 
private providers suspended the services of the water points for a while and during that time they 
faced a serious crisis of water. Therefore, their satisfaction level on this count is very low. 
Figure 3.3. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Water Service Delivery 
(% of Households)
3.2.1.4 The cost for Water Supply
Since there is no government water supply in the slum, slum dwellers have to buy water at a 
high price. They buy one kolshi drinking water for 1 taka and sometimes for 2 taka. The survey 
households spend a monthly amount of 50 - 500 and above taka for water. The following fi gure 
reveals that the majority house owners (26.67 percent) and tenants (61.64 percent) pay 51-100 
taka per month for drinking water. 21.33 percent house owners and 17.12 percent tenants spend 
101-150 taka for water. In addition, 5.33 percent house owner and .68 percent tenants also pay 
500 and above taka for their water. In the dry season, the situation is gets worse because the 
underground water level goes down. Therefore, water scarcity becomes acute at that time. On this 
pretext, water providers increase the price of their water maximizing their profi t and forcing people 
to buy water at a high price.   
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3.2.2  Sanitation 
Good sanitation services are essential for keeping the environment clean and for the development 
of public health. On the other hand, unhygienic sanitation is the direct cause of large-scale incidence 
of diseases, such as diarrhoea, jaundice, typhoid and malaria in Dhaka. Sanitation services include 
sewerage and garbage disposal. In Dhaka, storm water drainage is the responsibility of the DWASA, 
while garbage collection and disposal are the responsibility of the city corporation. The sanitation 
systems in the city are made up of waterborne systems, sanitary latrines, and direct disposal of 
waste in open fi elds, pit latrines and safety tanks. However, the public sanitation service in Dhaka 
is very poor. Persistent drainage congestion and water logging problems in many areas of Dhaka 
city are aggravating the hygienic condition through on overfl ow of sewers, contamination of water 
sources, spread of diseases, mosquito proliferation, etc. Those who are most affected by this are 
the poor and the slum dwellers. 
DWASA is responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of the sewerage system in 
Dhaka. But its sewerage service has major defi ciencies on both the supply and demand sides. In 
terms of supply, the sewerage system has problems of sewerage overfl ow, especially during the 
rainy season, and lack of connections. The sewerage treatment capacity of Dhaka city is much below 
the demand. Currently, both the industrial and domestic sewerages are being disposed untreated 
into the wetlands and natural streams in and around Dhaka city causing serious environmental 
hazards as well as the pollution of river water (DWASA, 2004). Slowly it is also affecting the ground 
water quality. Only about 50 percent of the city population has access to the DWASA sewerage 
system (Siddiqui et al, 2004) and the remaining population either has no sanitary latrines or is 
served by septic tanks built and maintained privately. The DWASA sewerage system is not at all in 
order (ibid). Waste material leaks out continuously through cracks in the sewerage lines, causing 
serious environmental pollution. The storm water sewers are also not cleared regularly, as a result 
of which waterlogged patches pose a permanent problem in many parts of Dhaka city.    
3.2.2.1 Access and use 
One recent estimate shows that in metropolitan slums only 14 percent households have sanitary 
latrines (Nari Maitree, 2005). With respect to access to sanitary services, 92 percent house owners 
and 83.33 percent tenants reported that sanitation services were accessible to them (Figure 3.5). 
In the past, there were open toilets in the slum but now most of the households have access 
Figure 3.4. Monthly Service Cost for Water Service (% of Households)
27
to sanitary toilets and latrines. Very few households have water sealed toilets. In addition, there 
were some community latrines (maximum 10 people can use this) in the slum. 92 percent house 
owners and 81.33 percent tenants used the sanitary service. Government and some NGOs namely 
PROSHIKA, CUP and DSK are providing sanitation services in Korail slum. Most of the NGOs are 
providing slabs for toilets free of cost. Moreover, some NGOs are disbursing loans for sanitation in 
the slums. In the different focus group discussions, the participants have reported that they have 
average sanitation service in the slum. 
Figure 3.5. Access and use of Sanitary Service (% of Households)
3.2.2.2 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction
Although majority households have access to sanitation and are using sanitary latrines and water 
sealed toilets, they are not satisfi ed with toilet facilities in the slum. 52.17 percent house owner 
and 54.10 percent tenants expressed their dissatisfaction regarding this (Figure 3.6). On the other 
hand, 47.83 percent house owners and 45.90 percent tenants were satisfi ed in this regard. The 
use of slab latrines and water sealed toilets does not seem to make them feel satisfi ed because 
the extent and quality of the satiation service they are getting is very poor. Dissatisfaction is high 
among the tenants. Blockage of sewerage, leakage and overfl ow of sewerage were the reasons 
for their dissatisfaction. Due to this poor sanitary condition, people are often forced to defecate in 
open places. This practice of open defecation leads to the contamination of the local water sources 
and ultimately causes 80 percent of the diseases occurring in the slum- diseases like diarrhoea, 
cholera, dysentery, blood-dysentery etc. The children of the slum are the main victims of such poor 
sanitation practices.    
Figure 3.6. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Sanitation Service Delivery 
(% of Households)
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3.2.2.3 Cost for Sanitary Service
Generally, most of the service providers and NGOs provide sanitary services in the slum free of 
cost. However, the household survey data revealed that 43.47 percent house owners and 3.38 
percent tenants were paying money for sanitary service (Table 3.2). In the focus group discussions 
the participants described the process of paying money. The service providers (those offi cials who 
are responsible for providing the material in specifi c slums) and some community leaders are the 
mediators in this process. They collect money from the households as travel and establishment 
costs and share it with a section of offi cials responsible for service provision. However, when the 
study team talked with the service providing agencies and NGOs, they strongly denied taking 
money and said that they were providing service free of cost. In addition, some house owners are 
taking loans from NGOs in this regard. 
Table 3.2.  Monthly Service Cost for Sanitary Service (% of Households)
Monthly Cost for Sanitation (in taka) House owner Tenant
<=50 43.47 3.38
51-100 5.79 -
151-200 5.79 -
301-500 1.45 -
Total (N) 39 4
3.2.3  Electricity and Street Lighting
Access to electricity is an important tool for development and poverty alleviation. Reliable and 
quality electricity supply available to all people of Bangladesh at affordable prices can improve 
the standard of living and enhance economic development.  The Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources Vision Statement (2000) indicates that its objective is to provide “access to affordable 
and reliable electricity to the majority of the people of Bangladesh by 2020.” However, at present 
the supply of electricity is highly inadequate in comparison with the requirements of the people 
in the countryside, in general, and the city dwellers, in particular. Offi cial estimates show that 
access to and consumption of electricity by rural and urban Bangladeshis is one of the lowest in 
the world:  less than 20 percent of the population has access (4.3 million consuming entities), of 
which 80 percent live in urban areas (3.4 million) (World Bank, 2002b). Another estimate shows that 
only 65 percent of Dhaka’s households have access to electricity. Of them, 40 percent have legal 
connections and 25 percent illegal (Siddiqui et al, 2004). Moreover, when electricity is available, 
there is frequent voltage fl uctuation and daily load shedding in most areas of Dhaka city. As a result, 
electric gadgets go out of order frequently. Owing to the inadequate supply of electricity, industrial 
production in the city suffers and as a result it directly affects the economy. The whole electricity 
supply system, like the water and sewerage systems, is in a mess, with system a loss of over 40 
percent, mainly due to illegal connections and false billing. 
Electricity services are provided by Dhaka Electric Supply Authority (DESA created in 1991) and 
Dhaka Electric Supply Company (DESCO created in 1996) in Dhaka and Bangladesh Power 
Development Board (BPDB) in the other cities. On the other hand, street lighting service is provided 
by Dhaka City Corporation (DCC). DESA is not a power producing organization; therefore, it 
has to buy its entire requirement from the BPDB. DESA consumes about 50 percent of the total 
electricity generated in the country (ibid). DESA distributes electricity to the Dhaka Metropolitan 
area, offi cially serving approximately 490,000 customers (World Bank, 2002b), whereas DESCO 
covers the Mirpur, Uttara, Gulshan and its adjoining areas of Dhaka metropolis and has 2,49399 
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customers (data provided by DESCO). The present system loss in the DESA and DESCO are 
respectively 25 percent and 17 percent (data from DESCO). However, there is a perception of 
serious corruption in DESA. The various corrupt practices in DESA are as follows: illegal electricity 
connections to shops, industries and residential houses; inaccurate meter reading and tampering 
with meters for bribes through a collusion between offi cials and powerful customers; installation of 
new connections and up-gradation of existing ones only if bribes are paid; collusion with contractors 
in procurement of materials, installation of new lines and construction of new facilities; collective 
and systematic pilferage of the maintenance funds in the power stations, which ultimately results 
in frequent breakdowns; and bribes for lucrative postings. DESA suffers a loss of 325 crore taka 
every year due to malpractices like pilferage of power through illegal connections, meter tampering 
and under-billing by vested groups (News Network, 2003a). When contacted, offi cial sources have 
acknowledged the fact that DESA had to suffer at least 13 percent system loss due to corruption 
and 12 percent for technical reasons. Corrupt elements in the management and the trade union 
leadership are often hand in glove. In the slum areas, mastaans are also involved in corruption as 
middlemen.  DESA is heavily biased in favour of the rich and the powerful. In a study, 96 percent 
respondents reported that DESA did not bother about poor people. This was also confi rmed by the 
overwhelming majority of journalists and researchers interviewed in the study. According to them, 
DESA’s main benefi ciaries were the rich, followed by the middle class; only a handful of the poor 
benefi ted from DESA (Siddiqui, 2000:118). In this situation, donor agencies advised the government 
to build a company for giving better electricity services to the urban people and this way DESCO 
was formed to provide electricity service in Dhaka city. Korail slum is under the DESCO area.  
3.2.3.1 Access to and use of Electricity 
The survey asked respondents about their access and use of electricity and street lighting. It also 
enquired among the users about their satisfaction with the service. Survey results show that electricity 
is accessible to the vast majority of the respondents. As for street lighting, Korail slum does not 
have this service. As a result, the whole slum becomes dark at night. 96 percent house owners and 
80 percent tenants reported that electricity service was accessible to them (Figure 3.7). In addition, 
the same percentage of house owners and 74 percent tenants reported that they had electricity 
connections in their households. Some tenants (26 percent) reported that because of lack of money 
they could not use this service. In the slum, there are legal and illegal electricity connections. 
However, most of the respondents were willing to admit that their electricity connections were 
mostly illegal. In the focus group discussions participants also acknowledged that their electricity 
connections were illegal and they had detailed knowledge of how illegal connections were made. 
Slum dwellers are generally aware that ‘holding numbers’ are required to get a legal electricity 
connection, which includes the installation of a meter. Since Korail slum does not have the holding 
number, they buy connections from people (living near the slum) with legal access to electricity 
and pay for the service at “market” rates. Those who are dealing in electricity in the slum got their 
meters legally and then started their business. In this way one person can provide electricity to150-
200 households and pay the monthly bills to the local electricity offi ce. These people are generally 
the infl uential house owners (having money and muscle power) of the slum. 
30
A representative of DESCO reported that “infl uential” people were able to obtain illegal connections 
using threats or political infl uence. He also confi rmed that it was common for people to steal 
electricity for business and personal use by directly tapping electric poles, sometimes without the 
knowledge of the electricity offi ce. Most respondents of the survey reported that illegal connections 
were obtained in collusion with the DESCO staff such as meter readers, linemen, etc. In some cases, 
the slum dwellers are allowed to use electricity only for a limited period by day. In a discussion, the 
DCC’s Executive Engineer (Electricity) has said, “Although the slum development unit of DCC is 
responsible for street lighting in the city, because of the absence of holding numbers it could not 
provide street light to the slums.”
3.2.3.2 Problems with Electricity and Street Lighting 
The vast majority of users have reported that they have problems with using electricity in their 
households. Between 96 percent house owners and 93 percent tenants have reported having 
problems with electricity (Figure 3.8). 
Figure 3.7. Access and use of Electricity and Street Lighting Service (% of Households)
Figure 3.8. Faced problems with electricity and street lighting (% of Households)
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Of those who have reported problems an overwhelming majority (61 percent house owners and 69 
percent tenants) have claimed that they are paying a high price for electricity consumption (Table 
3.3). They have to pay 100 taka for each electric bulb, fan and TV.  Moreover, 19 percent house 
owners and 17 percent tenants have reported mismanagement. By mismanagement they mean 
load shedding, voltage fl uctuation, low voltage, power breakdown, over billing, etc. Although they 
are paying a high price, the services are not good and regular. Therefore, 11 percent house owners 
and 6 percent tenants have complained of irregular service delivery. Every month they are to go 
without electricity for 5-10 days and sometimes it goes up to 15 days. 
Table 3.3. Types/nature of problems with electricity and street lighting (% of Households) 
Nature/types of problem House owner Tenant
Irregular service delivery 11.11 5.71
High cost 61.11 68.57
Low quality service 6.94 8.57
Mismanagement 19.44 17.14
Have to pay bribe for service 1.39 5.71
Total (N) 72 140
According to DESCO, there is a formal complaint box available at the Executive Engineer’s offi ce 
that consumers can use to report the problems they encounter. Most slum dwellers are aware that 
they have illegal connections, and as they do not have holding numbers, they feel that they do not 
have a basis to complain. Majority house owners and tenants have reported that they never fi led 
any complaint to the service providers. Moreover, 48.71 house owners and 61.11 percent tenants 
have said that service providers could not solve their problems. They are also concerned that they 
may be vulnerable to eviction or harassment if they complain to authorities. One participant in a 
FGD has complained that ‘when they went to visit the local Ward Commissioner he said that since 
slums situated on illegal land, the Government cannot provide electricity services.’    
3.2.3.3 Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Though people have some access to electricity in Korail slum, their satisfaction level is very low. 
Only 10 percent house owners and 8 percent tenants are satisfi ed with the electricity service (Figure 
3.9). Majority house owners (90.28 percent) and tenants (91.89 percent) are dissatisfi ed with the 
service. The reasons for dissatisfaction are many. The slum dwellers have to pay a very high price 
for electricity but the services are inadequate and irregular. Every month the consumers are denied 
electricity for 5-10 days and sometimes it goes up to 15 days. In addition, load shedding is common 
to the slum. In the focus group discussion, most participants have indicated that this is a daily 
occurrence and it happens several times a day. Moreover, voltage fl uctuation, low voltage, power 
breakdown and over billing are common problems. In addition, they have to pay the whole month’s 
bill though they do not get electricity for long time. In an FGD with tenants one participant has said, 
“The linemen supply electricity for 2/3days properly before getting the bill but after the payment the 
scenario is different”. Another participant has said,” If we did not pay the bill (for irregularity) in due 
time, the linemen will disconnect the line”. 
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3.2.3.4 What poor households pay for electricity? 
The survey asked respondents about the costs of getting electricity connections and using the 
service. It has been learnt that ironically, the poor users have to bear a lager burden of costs for 
electricity service. The responses indicate that households spend on an average 50-500 taka and 
above for electricity consumption (Figure 3.10). Majority house owners (80.56 percent) spend 151- 
500 taka per month for electricity consumption whereas 47.75 percent tenants spend 51-100 taka 
and 49.55 percent 101-300 taka per month in this regard. Generally, house owners and tenants 
have to pay the same price for electricity consumption, but in some cases people were paying less 
because of their closeness to infl uential people. Sometimes tenants shared the costs between 
2/3 persons and each person paid 50 taka. Survey data and focus group discussions have also 
revealed that slum dwellers had access to illegally procured electricity only for a limited period 
and had to pay the prevalent “market” price of 100 taka per month for each electric bulb, fan and 
television. On the other hand, if they could get a legal connection, the service would be available 
to them 24 hours a day and their cost would not exceed 13-15 taka per month at the existing rate. 
They have to pay additional 200-500 taka in advance for connection. 
However, the results of the survey and focus group discussions show that people are willing to pay 
highly for this “essential” service. In an interview, a local service provider mentioned that with the 
help of a DESCO offi cial he managed a meter for his personal use. He had to pay a big amount 
of extra money to the DESCO staff for that. After getting the meter he decided to give connections 
to other households (including house owners and tenants). In this way he started a business of 
electricity. They have to pay the monthly bill to the DESCO offi ce and some extra money to the 
providers (especially meter readers) for doing business and to get the electricity bill reduced. 
Moreover, they have to pay bribe as “tax” to the police every month.      
Figure 3.9. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about electricity and street lighting 
(% of Households)
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3.2.4  Roads and paving
According to the 1983 Ordinance of Dhaka City Corporation (DCC), construction and maintenance 
of roads, bridges and highways are compulsory functions of the DCC. Therefore, the DCC 
is responsible for this service in the Dhaka city. Although, the development budget of the DCC 
provides for the welfare of slum, in reality in maximum cases this arrangement does not work. In an 
interview, the Slum Development Offi cer of the DCC has said, “Last year the DCC spent 250 crore 
(from special and general development fund) taka for the development of roads, toilets and lighting 
for the slum dwellers in the Dhaka city”. However, the respondents of the survey and participants 
of the FGDs of the study mentioned that they never received any allocation from DCC for roads 
and paving. Most of the slum land is illegal and has no holding number, and therefore, the services 
related to roads and paving are totally absent in the slums. The President of the Busti Odhikar 
Surokha Committee (Slum Rights Protection Committee) has reported that NGOs also are not 
working for constructing paving and roads inside the slum. The slum community has constructed 
some narrow roads by spending their own money.  
During the household survey it has been observed that there are two east-west lying pucca roads 
within the slum and the rest are south-north lying narrow mud passages which are mostly stingy 
and unsuitable for vehicles. The situation worsens during the rainy season. At that time, house 
owners buy rubbish (wastage of concrete materials) and throw this along the roads for walking. 
3.2.4.1 Access and use
Although the condition of roads and paving is not good in the Slum, household survey results show 
that roads and paving service is accessible to majority house owners (92 percent) and tenants (72 
percent) and the same percentage of house owners and tenants used this service (Figure 3.11). In 
the slum open space means the roads; therefore, children use the roads for playing games. There 
are a few shops in the roads also.
Figure 3.10. Monthly service cost for electricity and street lighting (% of Households)
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3.2.4.2 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction 
The satisfaction about the condition of roads and paving in the slum is very low. Only 8.7 percent 
house owners and 14.81 percent tenants are satisfi ed with this service (Figure 3.12). Besides, 
91.30 percent house owners and 85.19 percent tenants are dissatisfi ed with the current situation of 
roads and paving. Most roads are very narrow and there is no paved road in the slum. Most of the 
roads are unstructured and made of mud and concrete/ brick dust. Dissatisfaction runs high in the 
rainy season because in that time the roads fi lled up with water and the slum dwellers face serious 
problems in their communication.  
Figure 3.11. Access and Use of Roads and Paving Service (% of Households)
Figure 3.12. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Roads and Paving Service 
(% of Households)
3.2.4.3 The cost for service 
The government and the NGOs are not providing any road service in the slum. Generally house 
owners collectively spend money for the construction of the roads in the Korail Slum. Out of 75, 34 
house owners paid 50 taka each for the construction and maintenance of roads in the Slum (Table 
3.4). Moreover, 10 house owners paid 51-100 taka for roads. On the other hand, only 3 tenants paid 
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in this regard. During the rainy season, the roads are fi lled with water. Therefore, house owners buy 
rubbish (wastage of concrete materials) and throw this along the roads for walking. Every house 
owner has to pay 200-500 taka for using rubbish in the rainy season. The tenants do not spend any 
money for this.
Table 3.4. Monthly Service Cost for Roads and Paving Service (% of Households) 
Monthly cost for roads and paving (in taka) House owner Tenant
<=50 72.34 66.67
51-100 21.28 -
151-200 2.13 33.33
201-300 2.13 -
>500 Above 2.13 -
Total (N) 47 3
3.2.5  Drainage 
Persistent drainage congestion and the water logging problem in many areas of Dhaka city is 
aggravating unhygienic condition like overfl ow of sewers, contamination of water sources, spread 
of diseases, mosquito proliferation, etc. Those who are most affected by this are the poor and the 
slum dwellers, the most vulnerable segment of the urban society. 
DWASA is responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of drainage facilities in 
Dhaka city. In 1989, the responsibility of storm water drainage management was transferred to 
DWASA from the Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE).
It is worth noting that Dhaka city had an excellent natural drainage system even 40 years ago. With 
the rapid expansion of the city, the natural drainage system has been disrupted and in some places 
destroyed. In the late 1960s, a master plan of city drainage and fl ood control was drawn up. Again, 
in the early 1990s, a master plan was formulated under a Flood Action Plan. By the time that has 
elapsed after the preparation of the Plan, the drainage scenario has changed quite signifi cantly 
due to various changes in the topography, land use and development interventions. The condition 
of storm water drainage is also currently in a bad shape. Once Dhaka city was interlaced with 
numerous natural channels and wetlands which acted as conveyance passages and temporary 
detention systems for the storm water accumulated in the city. These are being continuously fi lled 
up by new settlements. Unplanned expansion of the city is destroying the entire natural drainage 
system causing fl ooding due to poor drainage in many parts of the city. DWASA has a service area 
of 140 sq. km which includes 8 km box culverts and 65 km open channel. There are 225 km pipe 
drain and 3 pump stations having a capacity of 41.6 cumec against the estimated storm water 
generation of 140 cumec (DWASA, 2004).    
3.2.5.1 Access and use 
The survey asked respondents about their access to and use of drainage service. Although majority 
respondents (81.33 percent house owners and 49.33 percent tenants) have reported that they have 
access to drainage service and use the drains (Figure 3.13), most of the respondents of survey 
and participants of FGDs have reported that the quality of drainage service is very low in the Korail
slum. Compared to the area and population of the slum, the number of drains was very small. There 
are a few drains inside the slum which do not cover the whole area. These drains are located near 
the bajar area and the remaining area lacks a drainage system. Moreover, the quality of the drains 
is not good at all, and most of them are unstructured and so narrow that garbage and wastewater 
could not pass smoothly. In case of raining, the wastewater from the drain fl ows out to the roads.   
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3.2.5.2 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction
Although majority respondents have reported that drainage service is accessible to them, their 
satisfaction level is very low. Among the users, only 18 percent house owners and 39 percent 
tenants are satisfi ed with the service (Figure 3.14). On the other hand, 82 percent house owners 
and 61percent tenants are dissatisfi ed with the drainage service in the slum. In the different focus 
group discussions participants have frequently mentioned their drainage problem. They said that 
Government and other NGOs should provide drainage service in the slum for the sake of their 
health. 
Figure 3.13. Access and use of Drainage Service (% of Households)
Figure 3.14. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Drainage Service Delivery 
(% of Households)
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3.2.5.3 The cost for service
In the previous sections it has been mentioned that house owners have built a few drains in the 
slum with their own money and every week they clean these drains with funds raised from among 
themselves. For cleaning these drains every house owner pays 15-20 taka every week. In some 
cases, house owners clean the drains by themselves. There is no instance of tenants giving money 
for the construction of the drains and also for cleaning them. Out of 75 survey house owners, only 
35 have reported spending on the drainage service (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5. Monthly Service Cost for Drainage Service (% of Households) 
Monthly cost for drainage (in taka) House owner Tenant
<=50 85.71 -
51-100 14.29 -
Total (N) 35 -
3.2.6  Solid Waste Management 
Solid waste management in the city of Dhaka is a major issue and a grave concern for the city 
dwellers as a whole. This is mainly due to the rapid urbanization taking place on an enormous 
scale. Rapid population growth and uncontrolled urbanization is severely degrading the urban 
environment and placing serious strains on resources and consequently undermining equitable 
and sustainable development. Generation of waste has become a formidable problem because 
of its disposal and impact on the environment. The waste disposal problem will assume a serious 
magnitude when the city doubles its population in the next 30 years or so. Greater Dhaka will 
produce 4000 tons of solid household waste, as its population will swell to 19 million by the year 
2015. With the unabated concentration of people in the urban areas, the use of material products 
is increasing manifold causing a great problem of waste management. The situation will further 
deteriorate and may go beyond control unless appropriate steps are taken for effective waste 
management. 
The Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) is the only formal organization responsible for waste management 
(collection, transportation and disposal) in Dhaka city in an area of 360 sq km with a population of 
7.5 million (Population Census, 2001). There is a separate wing called the conservancy unit in the 
DCC which is headed by a Chief Conservancy Offi cer (CCO) to accomplish the waste management 
activity. DCC is expected to keep the city neat and clean providing necessary conservancy services. 
Thirty-fi ve thousand tons of waste is generated per day in the city with some seasonal variations. 
Average generation of waste in the city is 1.35 kg per family and 0.245 kg per capita (IDPAA, 
2001). However, DCC is unable to provide satisfactory conservancy services to the city dwellers. 
In Dhaka, garbage is scattered everywhere, dumped or piled up in the streets. The environmental 
degradation is accelerating along with the spread of diseases. Within the Dhaka Metropolitan area, 
only 50 percent of the inhabitants discard their waste in allotted dustbins. Of the rest, 20 percent 
use roads, 20 per cent use drains and 10 per cent dispose their garbage in open places. There are 
certain people, who cull material from the disposed garbage and make a living out of it (Unnayan 
Shannmannay, 2004:7).  Data provided by DCC indicate that out of the total waste generated in 
the city everyday, household waste turns out to be 1781 tons accounting for about 50 percent of 
the total. 
However, being disappointed with the unsatisfactory conservancy services of DCC, some conscious 
people and NGOs came forward and undertook private initiatives fi rstly with a view to keeping their 
localities neat and clean and secondly, to earn something from such initiatives. Therefore, there 
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are three groups actively involved in the process of solid waste management in Dhaka. The fi rst 
group consists of the city dwellers that generate solid waste. The second group is composed of the 
local people who collect wastes from door to door and carry them to the nearest bin located on the 
streetside. And the third group is the DCC, which collects waste from the bins, and carry it to the 
fi nal disposal site. 
3.2.6.1 Access and use
Although, the garbage disposal methods in Dhaka include garbage bins placed and serviced by 
municipal authorities, pick-up services by private companies and NGOs, direct disposal in open 
places and in drains and other methods, in the korail slum there is no service from the DCC, 
private companies and NGOs in this regard. It has been found that there is no garbage bin in the 
Korail slum, the nearest one being far away from the slum. The korail slum people have fewer 
options than do other city dwellers, they have to dispose of garbage mainly throwing it in open 
places or drains which is very unsanitary and refl ective of how under-served their areas are by the 
municipal authorities. However, 67 percent house owners and 57 percent tenants have reported 
that garbage disposal is accessible to them and the same percentage of house owners and tenants 
used the service (Table 3.6). There are problems in survey results and observation in this regard. 
The respondents might not be careful to give their responses in the matter. The households in the 
front and the last clusters throw their wastage to the jhil and the households in the middle cluster 
dispose their wastes in a specifi c hole. In a focus group discussion with house owners from the 
middle cluster households, it has been learnt that participants mentioned that recently a few house 
owners of this cluster rent a van to collect the wastes every other day or more than once a week. 
The van serves 15-20 households and collects garbage and dumps them in the City Corporation’s 
bin in Banani area.      
Table 3.6. Access and Use of Solid Waste Management Service (% of Households) 
Response
Access Use
House Owner Tenant House Owner Tenant
Yes 66.67 56.67 66.67 56.67
No 33.3 43.33 33.3 43.33
Total (N) 75 150 75 150
3.2.6.2 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction 
The satisfaction rates with garbage disposal are very low in the slum. Only 50 house owners (out of 
75) and 85 (out of 150) tenants gave their responses regarding this (Figure 3.15). Among them, 28 
percent house owners and 20 percent tenants are satisfi ed with this service. Majority respondents 
(72 percent house owners and 80 percent tenants) have expressed their dissatisfaction regarding 
this service. Garbage is scattered everywhere and dumped in the open places. People are 
throwing their garbage in to the jhil and using this water for washing and bathing. Therefore, this is 
creating serious health risks for slum dwellers. In this regard, BOSC president said, “In the eye of 
Government and DCC slum people are not human beings; therefore, they are not bothered about 
the environment and health condition of the slum”.    
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3.2.6.3 The cost for service
Since there is no structured solid waste management service in the slum, the slum people do 
not pay any money for this. However, as mentioned above, some people from the middle cluster 
rent a van for garbage collection. The following table shows those people’s responses. These 
respondents spend less then 50-100 taka each for this service (Table 3.7).
Figure 3.15. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Solid Waste Management Service 
(% of Households)
Table 3.7. Monthly Service Cost for Solid Waste Management (% of Households) 
Monthly cost for 
Solid Waste Management (in taka)
House owner Tenant
<=50 77.78 90.91
51-100 22.22 9.09
Total (N) 9 11
3.3  Conclusion
From the household survey, FGDs and semi-structured interviews it is evident that infrastructure 
service delivery is very inadequate for the poor slum people. Slum dwellers are vulnerable in 
accessing infrastructure services because many service providers do not work there. It has been 
also found that the services that exist in the slum are of low quality and their costs are very high. 
Most of the services are accessible to the slum people but majority of them are dissatisfi ed with 
these services. They face different problems with these services. There are both legal and illegal 
services in the slum and as well as corruption in the process of delivering services.     
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4. Overview of Corruption in Infrastructure Service Delivery
4.1  Introduction
Corruption is reportedly widespread in Bangladesh. In fact, in the country corruption and other 
forms of weak governance are perceived to be an impediment to the reduction of poverty. 
Economic growth is essential to reduce poverty, and corruption slows economic growth. The 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index of 2005 rated Bangladesh as the 
most corrupt country in the world (score: 1.7 and ranked 158th out of 159 countries). Almost 
everybody suffers from corruption but the poor suffer more. The poor suffer from corruption 
in many ways and their access to services is reduced. Corruption invariably channels public 
resources to the rich while the poor lack the funds to bribe the service providers or pay for the 
services that are supposed to be provided cost-free as public services. 
In chapters two and three, we have seen that corruption persists in the delivery of 
infrastructure services in Bangladesh. And the most corrupt services are water supply and 
electricity. Corruption takes away much of the infrastructure service delivery depriving the 
poor of the service and compelling them to stay in the unbreakable debt trap and vicious 
cycle of poverty. Ahmad et al narrates the respondents’ experiences of corruption engulfi ng 
the education, health, police administration and judicial sectors. It is reported that after the 
liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 corruption in judicial administration gradually increased but 
after 1982 it increased phenomenally and corrupt practices permeate 90% of the judicial 
actions. Moreover, the study says that the subculture of corruption in education is vertically 
linked from the schools to the Education Board, from schools to the Directorate and from the 
Thana Education Offi cers (TEOs) to the ministry offi cials. There is also a high prevalence 
of corruption in the health service delivery. Corruption grips this sector in the areas of 
procurement and registration of clinics and diagnostic complexes, appointment, posting and 
promotion. Corruption is also related to inadequate supply of medicine and other materials 
and equipment (Ahmad et el: 2004). TIB (2004) reveals that 16 percent people paid a 200 
taka bribe to the union parishad leaders to get the sanitary latrines. 
Therefore, this chapter narrates the respondents’ experience of corruption in infrastructure 
services exploring the defi nition/meaning of corruption and its causes. It also shows the 
effects of corruption on the livelihoods of the poor, and the experience of those who were 
corrupt and describes the prevailing policies as well as the socio-economic and political 
climate.  
4.2  How is corruption perceived by the urban people?
The people of the Korail slum have developed a different set of criteria for expressing 
their perceptions of corruption. The Bangla phrases durniti and ghush are used to mean 
corruption by the urban poor people. Although their meaning varies from person to person, 
from professional to professional, the study fi nds a consistency in the perceptions of people 
which indicates a common pattern. In general, the people of the Korail slum have defi ned 
corruption as a condition where people use/consume public goods for private gain and where 
all social processes, structures, institutions, modes of exchange etc. have cumulative effects 
on corruption. The study asked respondents about the defi nition/meaning of corruption to 
obtain three prioritized responses (Table 4.1). In the fi rst priority, nearly half of the respondents 
(45.33 house owners and 47.33 percent tenants) defi ned corruption as taking bribe for service. 
A World Bank offi cial in his interview has said, “Files do not move in government offi ces 
without bribe. Bribe-taking has almost become as legitimate as taking salaries.” A high offi cial 
of DESCO also spoke in a similar vein, “There is no department or agency in Bangladesh 
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without corruption. It is generally known that every service provider or government offi cial is taking 
bribe. For this generalization, the honest people are victimized. Everybody knows who the culprits 
are but there is nothing to say. Actually the system is corrupt. The people of Bangladesh have little 
sense of proportion. Therefore, some people are taking benefi ts whenever they can”.
The President of BOSC has said in this regard, “For getting services one has to pay bribe at every 
step. Bribe is now known as honorarium/remuneration. In addition to the offi cial fees people have 
to make ‘under the table’ payments for getting and using public service”. 
One Chief Offi cer of DCC has said, “In Bangladesh, corruption exists in every sphere – government, 
private sector, voluntary service providing agencies  etc. Somewhere it happens openly and 
somewhere secretly. In the DCC, nobody is perfect. Corruption is like mosquitoes which we cannot 
eliminate but control”. 
Secondly, 14.67 house owners and 14.67 percent tenants mentioned illegal toll collection as 
corruption. It is necessary to explain the phrase ‘illegal toll collection’. The following example may 
be useful in this context. In the slum, some people are doing electricity business. ‘Managing the 
local DESCO offi cial’, they collect meters for their personal use. However, after getting the meter 
connection, they further sold it to the neighboring households. In that case, they are to make 
regular extra payments to the concerned DESCO offi cial. Such extra payments also helps them 
to get the electricity bill reduced. For the same reason, they are to make regular payments to the 
law enforcing agencies as well as to the local mastaans. The mastaans stay in business by bribing 
electricity offi cials and the police, and government is deprived of the much-needed revenues (World 
Bank 2002b). That means illegal toll collection involves a group of closely connected people who 
hold illegal discretionary power and capture public money for their personal gain. This fi nding is 
consistent with those of several studies (World Bank, 2002b; Narayan and Petesch, 2002 and TI-B, 
1997).  
One electricity businessman of the slum has said, “We are giving Tk. 5000-1000 per month as bribe 
to the DESCO offi cials and the police”. 
Some respondents tried to postulate the term adding some normative value to it such as nepotism, 
terrorism, illegal power play, etc. They also referred to ransom collection through abduction and 
kidnapping and other crimes (infl uence peddling, discrepancy between speech and practice, fraud, 
paying high prices for services, etc.). 
In the second prioritized responses, majority house owners and tenants (26.56 percent house 
owners and 28.78 percent tenants) mentioned illegal toll collection as corruption. In the third priority 
rank, majority (18.64 percent) house owners mentioned illegal toll collection and 29.13 percent 
tenants mentioned terrorism. 
Those who participated in the different FGDs have also defi ned corruption in a similar way. Moreover, 
to defi ne corruption they have used other phrases such as, bad behaviour of the service providers 
and law enforcing agencies, harassment by the police, discrepancy in speech and practice, delay 
receiving in service and high prices for basic services, etc. Participants in the FGDs repeatedly 
spoke of their fear of police abuse and wrongful arrests in the slum. They have said that without 
any proper reason the police arrest the Slum people and against this harassment they have to pay 
big amounts of money to the police. 
Monu Mia, a house owner, has said in an FGD, “The police always catch the innocent people 
instead of the guilty ones. They do nothing without a bribe. They do not come when they are 
informed of incidents occurring in the slum. And without giving money to the police it is not possible 
to lodge any complaint in the police station”. Other participants in an FGD have reported, “Thana 
offi cials are corrupt, unaccountable to any one for their ‘dishonest acts’ and they show respect only 
to the rich”.   
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Table 4.1. Defi nition/meaning of corruption (% of Households)
Meaning of 
corruption
House Owner Tenant
Ist 
Priority
2nd
Priority
3rd
Priority
Ist 
Priority
2nd
Priority
3rd
Priority
To accept bribe 45.33 14.06 8.47 47.33 7.27 8.66
Nepotism 5.33 7.81 15.25 10.00 11.51 9.45
Mismanagement 8.00 15.63 5.08 6.67 10.07 10.24
Illegal toll 
collection
14.67 26.56 18.64 11.33 28.78 14.17
Terrorism 9.33 23.44 16.95 14.67 13.67 29.13
Illegal power play 9.33 4.69 10.17 2.00 9.35 14.96
Forcible 
occupation
2.67 6.25 13.56 4.67 5.04 10.24
Ransom 
collection 
through captivity
4.00 - 10.17 0.67 2.88 2.36
Others 1.33 1.56 1.69 2.67 0.72 0.79
Total (N) 75 64 59 150 138 127
Note: Priority wise three responses considered
When the study team checked this with the local Ward Commissioner he said: “A slum is an illegal 
entity, therefore in slums people are doing illegal things and committing crimes on a regular basis. 
The police repeatedly visit this slum and sometimes arrest people and throw them into the jail for 
their safety”.  
The fi ndings of the study are consistent with several surveys which show that rather than protecting 
people, the police often harm people’s safety and public order (TI-B, 1997; BUP, 1997; BRCT 
1999; World Bank 2002b and Narayan and Petesch, 2002.) In the ‘Voices of the Poor Study’, slum 
dwellers state that they are frequent victims of false police charges, and that the police turn them 
in to criminals in order to protect the real culprits. They dub the police offi cers illegal toll collectors. 
Study participants also cite numerous cases of false imprisonment of breadwinners in particular, 
and stress the hardship this brings to poor households when loss of income is combined with legal 
fees (Narayan and Petesch, 2002). In some communities poor people noted that well being to them 
meant freedom from police harassment and hooliganism, as well as fair justice (Nabi et al, 1999). 
4.3  Causes of corruption 
We have seen in the literature review in chapter two that the causes of corruption are multiple, 
complex and always contextual. Its roots tend to be grounded in a country’s political and economic 
history, bureaucratic tradition and process of social and cultural transformation. In the current study, 
20 percent house owners have said that the failure to implement laws is the main cause of corruption 
(Table 4.2) in the fi rst priority. In Bangladesh, legal frameworks are ineffi cient - sometimes there 
are no laws where they are most needed and sometimes there are too many laws where only one 
or two would suffi ce. The enforcement of these laws is often very weak and inadequate. World 
Bank Country Director, Frederick T. Temple in a workshop said, “One of the reasons that corruption 
fl ourishes is that hardly anybody is ever punished for it. We all know that there is massive loan 
default, tax and customs evasion, power theft, procurement corruption and extortion in Bangladesh. 
Yet detection and punishment of these offences is very rare. The weak application of sanctions 
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refl ects the defi ciencies of the anti-corruption machinery and a judicial system in which justice is 
easily deferred” (News Network, 2003b). 
Misuse of political power is also responsible for corruption. Twenty percent tenants have said that 
political infl uence is the main cause of corruption. In the different FGDs participants have also 
acknowledge this cause. One participant has said, “There is a connection between corruption and 
politics. A person, who has political involvement/connection, becomes very rich suddenly through 
illegal activities. This is why a class of people is getting illegal money and the gap between them 
and the other classes is increasing”.
Moreover, in the second priority the same (21) percent house owners and tenants have mentioned 
political infl uence. In the different semi-structured interviews, professionals and service providers 
have also mentioned this cause. Amin, a sub-contractor said, “For getting government contracts, 
one needs to have political connection or infl uence. I don’t have this, and therefore I could not 
compete for a government tender. Those who have a political linkage and infl uence, can have 
the work and do corruption. He also said “Poor people do not have power and position in society, 
therefore they cannot do corruption. They can only steal to meet their basic needs”. 
In the third priority, 19 percent house owners and 18 percent tenants have reported the misuse of 
power as the cause of corruption. Some people control the public goods because they become 
providers of service or suppliers of goods. This is not merely a misuse of public offi ce but also role 
behavior of political institutions and private organization. The corrupt practices in public offi ces 
cannot have a prolonged existence without collusion with private actors (Ahmed et al, 2004).  
The respondents of semi-structured interviews have mentioned poverty, lack of accountability, 
bureaucratic excesses, mass unawareness, the domination of the local elite, the misuse of power, 
lack of moral education, absence of commitment to moral values, the opportunity to make black 
money, greater scope to evade punishment, low salary of the offi cials and lack of access to information 
as causes of corruption. Majority respondents of the semi-structured interviews have identifi ed the 
lack of transparency and accountability as a major cause of corruption in Bangladesh. 
One senior staff of Water Aid Bangladesh in her interview has said, “Mostly visible corruption exists 
in the infrastructure sector. For example, Government spend 1 crore taka for a building construction 
where the actual cost might be not more than 20 lakhs. And most of the infrastructure related 
works are funded by donors (like Water Aid) in Bangladesh. These donors are accountable to 
whom - Government, donors or people? Engineers are doing the infrastructure related works by 
the contractors in DCC. There is no scope for people to know how much money is spent for what 
purpose and what way?”
Some mentioned that an ineffi cient public administration, bad economic policies, a distorted reward 
system and a weak law and order situation degrade the morality of public servants and account for 
the rise in rent-seeking. One high offi cial of DCC has said: 
“Government built 1537 fl ats for poor people in Bhashantek (a slum in Mirpur).  ‘We’ and ‘the 
people like you’ (those who have power and connection) have grabbed these fl ats. It is a mistake 
of government to make government offi cials ‘offi cers’ rather than workers. If anyone steals a big 
amount of money he is never caught but if somebody steals little amount of money he must be 
punished or demoted. If the Mayor of the City Corporation is interested in to combating the corruption 
of the DCC staff, he can. But it is not possible to combat the corruption of engineers. Government 
and bureaucrats are busy taking care of their self-interest.” 
However, low salaries and inadequate opportunity for career development also force public servants 
and service providers to supplement their income through illegal means. Moreover, poor socio-
economic condition and the existence of a patron-client relationship reinforces corrupt practices 
in public dealing. Some have also said that there is a positive correlation between corruption and 
strong a desire for material wealth. 
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Table 4.2. Main causes of corruption (% of Households)
Main cause of 
corruption
House Owner Tenant
Ist 
Priority
2nd
Priority
3rd
Priority
Ist 
Priority
2nd
Priority
3rd
Priority
Poverty 16.00 1.49 3.17 10.00 2.86 9.68
Political 
Infl uence 
17.33 20.90 7.94 20.00 20.71 5.65
Unimplemented 
law 
20.00 10.45 15.87 18.00 15.00 12.10
Lack of 
Accountability 
5.33 13.43 3.17 12.00 8.57 6.45
Administrative 
diffi culty 
1.33 1.49 4.76 2.00 5.00 3.23
Mass 
unawareness 
5.33 4.48 3.17 10.00 5.00 2.42
Domination of 
the local elite 
1.33 5.97 6.35 5.33 4.29 5.65
Personnel gain 5.33 7.46 9.52 4.67 6.43 8.06
Misuse of Power 14.67 13.43 19.05 8.00 16.43 17.74
Lack of moral 
education 
5.33 4.48 11.11 0.67 7.14 16.13
Easiest way to 
earn 
5.33 14.93 15.87 7.33 7.86 10.48
Greater scope 
to avoid 
punishment 
1.33 1.49 - 2.00 0.71 2.42
Others 1.33 - - - - -
Total (N) 75 67 63 150 140 124
Note: Priority wise responses considered
4.4  The effects of corruption on the livelihoods of the poor
The quality of the urban environment depends largely on the quality of the basic urban infrastructure 
services like sewerage, sanitation, drainage, garbage disposal, drinking water supply and electricity. 
However, we have seen in the previous chapters that slum dwellers’ access to electricity, water 
supply, sanitation, roads and paving and solid waste management is very inadequate. Although most 
of the participants in the FGDs have said that as citizens and voters of the country it is their basic 
right to access and use the basic infrastructure services, the fact remains that government services 
do not reach them in the slum. Therefore, NGOs, donors and private individuals are delivering 
these services. On the other hand, government subsidies in the national budget amount to more 
than US$ 100 million a year in Bangladesh, more than the expenditure on health. The benefi ciaries 
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of such subsidies are the relatively affl uent 16 percent households that have electricity service. 
The poor lose from the budget subsidies to the power sector in two ways: lower rates of economic 
growth and less social expenditure from which they would benefi t directly (Lovei and McKechnie, 
not dated).
However, corruption increases the costs of public services and simultaneously it reduces their 
quantity and quality. Also corruption in infrastructure services reduces their quality and accessibility 
to poor people. When these sub-standard and over-priced goods and services are delivered 
through a corrupt price system they become fi nancially inaccessible to the poor. Corruption is 
forcing the poor to pay more, more often than the general people. In the absence of public services, 
slum people have to pay a high price for low quality services which affect their livelihoods largely. 
Commenting on the impact of corruption on development a report of the International Development 
Committee (22 March, 2001) says, “Corruption has a devastating impact on the poorest people 
in society by denying them access to public services since they are frequently unable to pay the 
necessary bribes. The quality of services and the effi cient allocation of resources are both adversely 
affected by corruption.” Ahmed et al (2004) also confi rms that the common man suffers much 
from malpractices perpetrated by government departments, local government institutions and the 
businessmen and even NGOs.      
The current study asked respondents about the impact of paying bribes on their households and 
livelihoods. It enquired about how they feel confronting the kinds of corruption and also tries to fi nd 
out who the prime victims of corruption are and how they cope with corruption. 
4.4.1  Impact of paying bribes on households’ livelihoods
The impact of paying bribes for services is enormous for poor slum people. It directly affects the 
poor people’s livelihoods. In the fi rst chapter, we have seen that majority households’ monthly 
income range between 1000-6000 and above taka and the average monthly income of majority 
house owners was 4500-6000 taka while 2000-4500 taka for tenants.  Therefore, one can imagine 
how tough it is for a slum dweller to give bribes or pay a high price for services. Here economic/
fi nancial loss is the most crucial factor. Most of the impacts the slum dwellers have mentioned 
are related to the economic factor.  We have collected three priority-wise responses from every 
respondent in this regard (Table 4.3). In the fi rst priority, 25 percent house owners have reported to 
have incurred pecuniary loss and 19.67 percent to have got into crisis (economic crisis) because 
of paying bribe. They also have a debt burden (19.67 percent.) On the other hand, majority tenants 
(28.28 percent) mentioned that because of paying bribes they could not have enough food to eat. 
It is notable here that compared to house owners, the economic condition of tenants is bad and 
therefore the effects of paying bribes are more serious on them than the house owners. A tenant, 
Zahir has said in an FGD, “Because of the cost of kerosene, and other extra payments such as 
giving money to the police and other offi cials of the law-enforcing agency for their help, we cut off 
our food cost. Sometimes we could not have enough food to eat.” As effects of corruption they 
have also mentioned having as debt burden (26.26 percent), getting into crisis (19.19 percent) 
and pecuniary loss (16.16 percent). One house owner, Habib, has said in an FGD, “In absence of 
electricity or in case of frequent load shedding we have to buy kerosene for hurricane (lantern). The 
price of kerosene is very high. Therefore, we have to spend extra money for kerosene while paying 
the monthly electric bill. Moreover, children’s education is interrupted for load shedding”. Another 
participant, Salam, has said, “In the slum, some people like me are doing economic work for which 
they need electricity supply (such as electric motor renting), and if the supply goes off then we 
cannot do our work. As a result, we face economic loss and our family suffers a lot.”
In the second priority, 20 percent house owners have mentioned pecuniary loss leading to fall into 
crisis whereas 27.40 percent tenants have mentioned debt burden and 16.44 percent pecuniary 
loss. Both the house owners and tenants reported that they could not spend money to meet the 
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necessities because of the pressure on their budget. In an FGD with tenants, one participant, 
Mustafi z, has said, “We have to incur food and other expenditures and cannot spend money for the 
children’s education. Very often we need to borrow money from relatives and neighbours.”
In the third priority, one-third (25 percent) house owners have reported that because of paying 
bribes they could not spend money to meet their necessities and 20 percent have said they could 
not save money. On the other hand, 28.85 percent tenants have mentioned debt burden and 21.15 
percent have said that they fall in crisis because of paying bribe and a high price for services. In 
an FGD, day labourer Hossain has said, “It is really tough for a day labourer to give a high price for 
electricity and water. You know it is not possible to get electricity and water connection without bribe 
or extra money. So, our budget is strained and we cannot afford to meet our needs. We cannot 
save anything for our future either.”
House owners and tenants have also mentioned other impacts of paying bribes such as their 
deprivation of medical facilities, loss in business, interruption children’s education, etc. Moreover, 
the slum people have reported that they are critical of government relief services. Either they do not 
receive the amounts allocated, or they need to bribe offi cials to get the relief at all. Many have said, 
“Relief should be channeled directly to them and not through local government”. The study could 
not fi nd any gender differences in experiencing corruption. 
Table 4.3. Impact of paying bribe on households (% of Households)
Impact
House Owner Tenant
Ist 
Priority
2nd
Priority
3rd
Priority
Ist 
Priority
2nd
Priority
3rd
Priority
Cannot have 
enough food to 
eat 
8.20 - 7.50 28.28 15.07 11.54
Incur debt 
burden 
19.67 12.00 10.00 26.26 27.40 28.85
Incur loss in 
business 
- 2.00 5.00 4.04 1.37 9.62
Pecuniary loss 24.59 20.00 12.50 16.16 16.44 7.69
Fall into crises 19.67 20.00 17.50 19.9 19.18 21.15
Deprived of 
treatment 
facilities
3.28 8.00 2.50 1.01 1.37 3.85
Cannot spend 
as and when 
necessary 
19.67 24.00 25.00 3.03 19.18 7.69
Cannot save 4.92 14.00 20.00 - - 9.62
Others - - - 2.02 - -
Total (N) 61 50 40 99 73 52
Note: Sixty one out of 75, house owners and 99 out of 150, tenants answered the question (priority-wise three 
responses have been considered)
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4.4.2  Feelings about the experience of corruption
The study enquired about how the respondents felt when they confronted any kind of corruption. 
Majority respondents (50.82 percent house owners and 47.12 percent tenants) have reported that 
they feel powerless when they confront any kind of corruption (Table 4.4). In the different FGDs, 
people have repeatedly expressed such sentiments.  In an FGD with tenants, one participant 
Mariam has said, “We are poor, and we are paying a high price for water and electricity. Still we 
have to face problems with drinking water and water for bathing. Sometimes we have to pass the 
whole day without food. We cannot buy daily goods and food. We cannot buy good fi sh for the 
children which makes us unhappy and helpless.”
However, 34.43 percent house owners and 37.50 percent tenants were frightened/ intimidated 
when they experienced corruption. Some house owners and tenants have also expressed the 
feeling of embarrassment and depression. In the third chapter we see that slum dwellers are not 
interested in complaining about services to their providers. Profound frustration with corruption 
and maltreatment is compounded by a sense of being voiceless and powerless to complain, since 
complaining may result in a loss of services and eviction from the slum. A poor women of the slum 
has said, “If anybody complaints or protests against this corruption, they are struck off the lists of 
all support services.”  
Table 4.4. Feelings to confront any kind of corruption (% of Households)
Feelings House owners Tenant
Frightened/ intimidated 34.43 37.50
Felt powerless 50.82 47.12
Feel embarrassed 9.84 11.54
Feel depressed 4.92 3.85
Total (N) 61 104
‘Voices of the Poor’ study’s respondents also had similar feelings about corruption. They reported 
that they had little access in different services and had widespread and intimate experience with 
corruption. Poor people’s interaction with representatives of the state left them feeling powerless, 
unheard and silenced (Narayan et al 2000). 
4.4.3  Prime victims of corruption
It has been found from the literature relating to corruption that poor people are the main victims 
of corruption. The study fi ndings also supplement this. Majority house owners (55 percent) and 
tenants (76 percent) have reported that poor people are the prime victims of corruption (Figure 
4.1). Another 40 percent house owners and 17 percent tenants have specially mentioned the slum 
dwellers as the main victims. A slum is an illegal entity and the dwellers do not have any holding 
number. There is a constant threat of eviction and police harassment there. Therefore, they are 
paying high prices and bribes for services without any hesitation. However, some tenants have 
also said that those who have no political affi liation are the victims of corruption. In the different 
focus group discussions participants have also mentioned that poor people are the main victims 
of infrastructure-related corruption. In this regard, Centre for Urban Studies (CUS) Chairman has 
said, “The poor are vulnerable in all respects to corruption. They lack fi nancial capital with the 
result that they cannot compete with the rich for resources, quality services and justice. Income 
poverty also makes them most dependent on public services and unable to go to the private sector 
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like the middle and upper classes. Besides, lack of education, civil rights awareness and social 
participation reduce their human, social and political capital and ability to defend themselves and 
hold the corrupt accountable.”
BOSC president has said in regard: “The main victims of corruption are the poor. And the slum 
dwellers mean fertile ground for government, NGOs and businessmen. The politicians and ward 
commissioners only visit the slums right before elections, and never fulfi ll their campaign promises 
once elected. They have power but no interest in the community. But what the people want is that the 
leaders work for their communities, they  don’t want promises. The insecurity of the slum dwellers 
could be removed if they could just settle in a permanent place without the fear of eviction from 
government lands. With secure shelter, they hope that the government will take further initiatives 
and provide electricity and water.”
Figure 4.1. Prime victims of corruption (% of Households)
4.4.4  Coping with corruption
The study asked respondents about their coping strategies and whom they consulted when they 
confronted any kind of corruption.  It also enquired if any institutions supported them in coping with 
corruption and which problems they thought they could solve themselves and for which they required 
external support. The people of the Korail slum have said that in case of experiencing corruption 
they generally cannot consult others. They try to solve the problems at their own initiatives. Very 
few respondents (12 house owners and 7 tenants) have said that they consult others when they 
confront corruption (Table 4.5). Very often they consult their neighbours (specially house owners) 
and relatives for getting support from them. In some cases, some house owners who have linkages 
with political elites try to solve the problem with their help.  Moreover, some people are paying big 
money to Lawyers to get the bail when they are implicated the case. Majority respondents have 
mentioned that they are poor powerless and frightened about police harassment. That is why they 
are not interested in consulting on such issues with others. 
In the slum, house owners mainly solve all kinds of infrastructure-related problems whereas tenants 
only solve the water and electricity-related problems. However, in case of sanitation some NGOs 
help the slum people. Also, some NGOs like BRAC and PROSHIKA have established some schools 
in the slum and the quality of education is quite satisfactory.     
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Table 4.5. Institutions/persons who can be consulted in case of experiencing corruption 
(% of Households)
Persons/Institutions 
House 
owners
Tenant
Local administration 16.67 14.29
Neighbours 16.67 28.57
Relatives 25.00 28.57
Political elites affi liated with the ruling party 25.00 14.29
Political elites affi liated with the opposition party 16.67 14.29
Total (N) 12 7
4.5  Experiences of those who are corrupt
The study tried to elicit the experiences of corrupt people and to understand their views of corruption. 
It is important to mention here that it was really tough to identify corrupt people and collect information 
from them. The study team contacted different service providing agencies and talked to them about 
their services and related corruption. Through these interviews some events came up where the 
corruption issue was discussed and some names were mentioned by the service providers and also 
by the slum people. We then tried to interview those providers and collect information regarding 
corruption. Every service provider acknowledged that corruption was rampant in the infrastructure 
services and there was a tendency to blame other people for corruption. Ahmad et al study (2004) 
also narrates the respondents’ experiences of corruption in different sectors. 
One high-level service provider has said, “Both service providers and recipients are responsible for 
corruption. Moreover, service providers/police on their own will not break the linkage which makes 
corrupt practices possible. It is the function of a vigilant society and committed governance to keep 
corruption below the tolerance level.”
Another corrupt provider said that one of the reasons put forward for corruption was the low level 
of income of government offi cials and service providers at the lower echelon and the lack of 
accountability at the upper end of the civil administration. 
One Ward Commissioner said that the police administration was blamed but no government brought 
the offending bureaucrats to book. He stressed that the police could not become corrupt without 
support from the politico-administrative system. He also emphasized that the police themselves 
would not break the linkage which made corrupt practices possible. Moreover, in a genuine civil 
society the role of the police is limited and their opportunity of being corrupt is limited. He expressed 
the opinion that when civil society harboured evil, the role of the police expanded and the opportunity 
of extortion increased. 
However, he asked the study team how the police could work without proper compensation. Mere 
subsidised housing and ration was not enough. They wanted their children to attend good schools, 
dress properly and enjoy due opportunities for a better life. Between their legal income and their 
minimum expenditure there existed a gap and through this gap extortion and corruption crept in. 
As the state failed to remunerate them properly, people were made to pay for service and if they 
were not able to pay they were made to forego justice. Of course, the extorted amount went beyond 
the minimum need. If they were rewarded on the basis of merit, one could demand honesty and 
obedience. He also mentioned that they had been elected commissioners by spending their own 
(large amounts) money. As ward commissioners they did not have any remuneration while they 
were giving voluntary services. They had to maintain their offi ces and bear the cost of entertaining 
people with tea and biscuits, giving money to the destitute and attending social and religious 
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occasions with gifts. Moreover, they had to take care of some local infl uential people (leaders) to 
get help in their work. Therefore, it was necessary to steal and in this way the system creates room 
for corruption. 
Another service provider said they were corrupt because the system was corrupt. Corruption in 
Bangladesh is largely the outcome of deviant bureaucratic behaviour in a decadent system, the 
reform of which is not on the priority agenda of the political system.   
Weak governance characterized by a lack of transparency, accountability and rule of law is linked 
to corruption and these are mutually reinforcing. Extensive discretionary power of the public 
offi cials with limited accountability gives rise to corruption. Ineffi cient legal frameworks and weak 
enforcement of these laws often encourages corruption. 
One electricity businessman in the Korail slum has said, “We have to pay 5-1000 taka every month 
as bribe to the DESCO offi cials (meter reader) and police. By giving bribes it was possible to reduce 
the electricity bill through an arrangement with the meter reader. For example, if the electric bill 
amounts to 10,000 taka, the meter reader is given 1000 taka to reduce the bill to 2000-3000 taka. 
When the electric meters are supplied to the consumers, they are duly sealed and are considered 
to be tamper-proof. However, meter readers break the original seal and install a similar seal which 
they can tamper with whenever necessary. Moreover, meter readers also prepare ‘ghost bills’ (bills 
without reading the meter).”  He also said, “We are doing this business to improve our economic 
condition. Therefore, we are giving electricity to the slum people at a high rate and by this high price 
we pay bribes and continue our business.”
The Ahmed et al (2004) study presents some cases of corruption in the health sector. For example, 
“In a case a person was seriously injured in a road accident and people rushed to a hospital 
with the victim. There was no doctor in the emergency. As the condition was serious, the people 
approached a doctor in Operation Theatre who just wrote something on a slip. The broken bone 
had to be fi xed and plaster of Paris applied. The doctor demanded money before anything could be 
done. The people paid the money and got the patient admitted but after a few days the patient was 
discharged because he had no money to pay.”
A doctor who listened to this allegation retorted by saying that they were corrupt because the 
system is corrupt. He would like to see fewer patients per day but nobody listened to his protests. 
He had to allow jumping the queue due to telephone calls from infl uential quarters. He felt the fees 
charged from the poor were atrocious as that was beyond their capacity to pay. Because of this 
they often felt ill again. The socialization of health care is a way out but the government policy is 
directed in the reverse direction (ibid). 
The business section of Deputy Commissioner offi ce has said there are several thousand hotels and 
restaurants in the capital though less than one thousand are registered. According to the Bangladesh 
Garments Manufactures and Exporters Association (BGMEA), there are nearly 4,000 garments 
industries around the country with 90 percent of those housed in Dhaka city and Narayangonj 
alone. All these garments units, small and medium factories and hotels and restaurants use more 
than one water connection in connivance with nearly 300 revenue inspectors of DWASA. These 
revenue inspectors are very strong and organised. Besides, they maintain political links through 
the trade union organisations and have regular underhand dealings with the high offi cials (News 
Network, 2004). 
“The revenue inspectors do not indulge in any illegal activity,” said a WASA offi cial in his interview, 
defending his apparently corrupt colleagues. But when the study team further probed this matter 
it found that one revenue offi cer and an inspector were suspended for such irregularities and 
corruption only a few months ago. 
52
One contractor of electricity in his interview has described the process of paying bribe. He has said 
that in service providing agencies like PDB, DESA, DESCO the practice of khushi kora (making 
happy) exists and there are people who assure saying “do the work we will make you happy later’’. 
Bribe taking or khushi kora has been seen from the lower level offi cials to the chief executive. At 
every stage of bidding contractors have to pay money. For example, to get the news of a tender one 
has to spend some money. Generally the news of a tender is publish confi dentially in uncommon 
newspapers and specially in festival times so that people fail to know about this. If one gets the 
information and submits an offer the concerned Executive Engineer demands specifi c amounts 
of money. Later, after the work is completed the fi nal payment has to done. In addition, one has 
to pay some tax or toll to the local mastaans for starting and doing the work peacefully. There is 
a provision in some departments that after the work in completed inspection has to done by an 
engineer. For getting a good inspection report the contractor needs to give some money to that 
engineer. If he/she refuses to give money (the amount of bribe depends on the budget of the work), 
then he/she will not get the report and bill in due time and even there is a risk of harassment. After 
completing the work some company adjust this khushi kora money in the budget as incidental cost. 
For this corruption and paying extra money (to the authority and mastaans), the contractors are 
bound to engage in dui numbari kaj (illegal activities).
However, most of the corrupt service providers have opined that good progress can be made in 
improving service delivery as well as corruption by improving incentives for service providers and 
consumers, enhancing salaries of offi cials, addressing several governance-related issues such as 
ensuring the fl ow of information, strengthening voices and oversight and institutionalizing a system 
of accountability that makes service providers answerable to service consumers.
4.6  Conclusion
From the fi ndings it is evident that corruption is widespread in infrastructure service delivery in 
Bangladesh and urban people are aware of this.  They have developed different criteria in expressing 
their perceptions of corruption. The urban people have mentioned multiple causes of corruption and 
the effects of corruption on their lives. The effects of corruption on the livelihoods of the poor are 
enormous and they lead to economic loss and the reduction of basic needs. From the experience of 
corrupt people, it is evident that they are also aware about the state of corruption in the country and 
because of the unaccountable and non-transparent socio-economic system corruption still persists 
on a large scale. In order to achieve a corruption-free society, the government, NGOs, donors and 
the private sector have to work together.
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5. Anti-corruption mechanisms- A critical review
5.1  Introduction
As illustrated in the previous section of the report, corruption in infrastructure service delivery 
has a very negative impact on the urban poor who are in reality the economic wheel of the 
city. What is worth mentioning is that over the years there also have developed different 
mechanisms both at the state and community levels to combat corruption in infrastructure 
service delivery so as to take these services to the doorstep of the poor. The underlying 
reason is that the traditional view of the urban poor as benefi ciaries of these services has 
been modifi ed by the now important right-based approaches claiming that the urban poor are 
as much owners of such services as the rich. In view of the above the present section is an 
endeavour to scrutinize the accountability arrangements in place which have direct bearings 
on the delivery of basic infrastructure services to the poor of Dhaka city. 
On the whole, there are two different types of accountability arrangement in relation to 
basic infrastructure service delivery i.e. the accountability arrangements in place and 
the accountability arrangements at policy/institutional level. The former is mostly 
customary in nature whereas the later includes policy instruments underlying at both state 
and institutional levels. There is a detailed analysis below of the accountability arrangements 
of both the types.
5.2  The accountability arrangements in place
In the study location there are eight different types of actor dealing with infrastructure service 
delivery ranging from the poor service recipients to the central government. Between these two 
there are the Mayor of DCC, service providers, ward commissioners, local service providers/
middlemen, local leaders, and the CSOs. There is a very complex and lengthy accountability 
mechanism there. Generally, the accountability arrangement amongst the actors is a vertical/
top-down one while in some instances horizontal accountability is also found. Besides, there 
are both one way and two-way accountability arrangements. Importantly, all actors do interact 
in any unique service delivery situation, rather in some cases they are totally isolated. So, 
it is not possible to exactly pinpoint the process fl ow of the accountability arrangements 
considering all the eight actors. The following fi gure offers only a bird’s eye view of that. 
5.2.1  Surface Level
As shown in the stated process fl ow, poor service recipients, local service providers 
(LSP)/middlemen and local leaders remain in the surface level of the fl ow chart and are 
accountable to one other. The accountability between local service providers and service 
recipients and between service recipients and local leaders are reciprocal and direct whereas 
the accountability between local service providers and local leaders is indirect and thereby 
invisible. 
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Figure 5.1. The accountability arrangements in place
Usually, the service recipients obtain necessary services from the local service providers. Though the 
local service providers have no obligation to render their legally or illegally owned services towards 
the recipients, they usually do so to reduce their losses in buying the service from government 
agencies, or on humanitarian grounds or solely from business motives. 
Table 5.1. The following arguments of the Korail slum dwellers may be relevant from the 
purpose:
To prevent lossesa Humanitarian groundsb Business motivec
Local service providers 
are to pay bribe to 
different actors in and 
around their business 
location on a monthly 
basis, the amount of 
which varies between 
Taka 5000 to 10000. It is 
obligatory to pay some 
extra amounts to the 
DWASA offi cials, to the 
local leaders/mastans in 
addition to the amounts 
they pay as the price for 
services. Besides, illegal 
taxes are to be paid to the 
police on a regular basis. 
For the last eight months 
I am involved in the 
business of water service 
delivery in the community. 
It is all due to pressures 
from and the needs of my 
community.  However it 
was not the prime concern 
when I fi rst decided to 
get water connection, 
rather the motive was self-
interest. Currently, of the 
50 inch water pipe that I 
have are only two inches 
legal, and the remaining 
48 inches are illegal.
We buy the services 
(Water, electricity) from 
someone who legally 
procures them. Those who 
have linkages with the 
frontline service providers 
get legal connections. If 
someone has government 
job and can face the 
associated harassment 
can more easily get 
service connection. 
a Abdur Rob, FGD participant, Korail middle    b Joynal Abedin, FGD participants, Korail middle 
c Habib Mistry, FGD participants, Korail East
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Notwithstanding the divergent motives behind the provision of services, there is an accountability 
arrangement between the local service providers and the service recipients. Because, in case of 
dissatisfactory services provided it becomes diffi cult for the service providers to collect prices from 
the service recipients. 
Similarly, service recipients also are accountable to the local service providers/ middlemen in the 
sense that they are all well-known neighbours and in case of illegal doings the service recipients are 
to keep that secret. Their failure to maintain secrecy leads to a denial of the services. As illustrated 
by one of the FGD participants Suruz, “Suppose I have an intimacy with 10/20 households within 
the community. Now either providing bribes or playing some tricks I am to manage some specifi c 
service from the service providers. Then I can provide the services to those who have expressed 
interest in that and agreed to pay the defi nite price.”  According to another FGD participant Sekander, 
“There are both legal and illegal water connections in the community. But whatever be the sources 
we are getting water from those and have kept ourselves surviving.” The inability to pay bills in time 
may lead to the disconnection of the services received. 
The accountability arrangements between service recipients and local leaders are two-way in 
nature. They are accountable to each other though the underlying motives vary. The local leaders 
of the ruling party are found most infl uential in the community. For the essential daily services, slum 
dwellers primarily depend on them. Due to their affi liation with the ruling party and thereby with 
the local administration, especially the police these people enjoy the illegal power to control every 
aspect of community life. In fact, they act as the local representatives of the central political actors. 
Slum dwellers fear them and consult them fi rst in case of any crisis that they confront regarding 
the basic services. Explaining this Mannan3, “We stay in the slums; this is why we are scared to 
express even a common feeling. Your deport may bring torture on us as we spoke to you. When I 
am caught, you will not come to rescue me.” It is mentionable that during its fi rst visit to the slum 
the study team faced barriers from one such infl uential local leader who said, “I will not allow any 
PROSHIKA employees to work within the community.” It is only after persuading the concerned 
ward commissioners that the study team could start its survey in the Korail slum.
Furthermore, because of their voting rights the slum dwellers often receive some humanitarian favor 
from the local leaders. As one woman commissioner said, “As the slums are in illegal land holdings, 
we cannot offi cially provide any services there. But we are quite aware of the illegal services there. 
Although we did not provide those, from humanitarian grounds we are not opposing them either. 
In possible instances we are providing unoffi cial support to them.” This has been confi rmed by an 
FGD participant “Gulshan Lake surrounds Korail slum in the south and east. In the North and west 
sides there are three passages on the T & T land. Recently, through an offi cial notifi cation T & T 
block the passages that were being used by the slum dwellers. Immediately after the blockade, the 
slum dwellers met the local representatives. After a few settings the concerned ward commissioner 
asked the community to demolish the blockade at night. Remaining behind the scene she however 
promised to provide all administrative support to the slum dwellers.”4
A few opposition party people, wealthy house owners with a strong social capital and with the ability 
to donate money for elections and a few T & T employees linked to trade unions are also among the 
local leaders in the Korail slum. These local leaders have their own followers within the community 
to whom they have an obligation. The leaders usually stand by their supporters in time of need. The 
latter reciprocate by organizing demonstrations, processions, meetings, gatherings etc, especially 
in the anti-government movements. It is interesting to note that these activities alternatively provide 
3  FGD participant, House owner category
4  Abdul Kuddus, FGD participants, House owners, Korail middle
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the ruling party affi liated local leaders with the opportunity to use the local administration in favor 
of their power drive in the community. This in turn causes massive corruption and ultimately leads 
to people’s greater in-access to services in the area. There is a trend in the slum community of the 
earning members of poor families being often arrested on real or fabricated charges. Now to be 
freed from police custody a large sum of money is needed and this pushes the arrestee’s family 
to borrow from the neighbours. The family is thus caught in a debt cycle with reduced capacity to 
access basic services. The local leaders of the ruling party act as mediators in these illegal money 
transactions and thus they develop a kind of accountability to both slum dwellers and government 
offi cials. 
The accountability arrangement between the local service providers and local leaders, however, 
is very indistinct. The local service providers are to provide a certain monthly amount to the local 
leaders (ruling party) to continue their businesses fearlessly. In some instances the transaction 
involves ‘payment on a necessity basis’. Besides, the local leaders often enjoy free services from 
the local service providers. In exchange of all these, the local leaders ensure necessary political 
shelter for the service providers. As one of the FGD participants said, “Those who are well-known 
as well as infl uential in the community are to pay less for the services .”5
5.2.2  Mid level
At the mid level of the fl ow chart remain the service providers and the local elected representatives. 
Both vertical and horizontal accountability are found to operate at this level. Vertically, in the 
upward direction service providers are found accountable to both DCC and central government. 
This is done either through DCC’s coordination meetings or the central government’s infl uence 
on policies/prescriptions, nominations, appointments, fi nance, regulations and often in delivering 
certain special services. 
Also there is a mutually benefi cial accountability mechanism between the legal service providers i.e. 
the staff of the parastatal service providing agencies and local service providers, i.e. the middlemen. 
Under an informal arrangement between them the fi eld staff of the legal service providers overlook 
the issue of illegal connections provided by the local service providers. On the other hand it is 
the local service providers’ responsibility to regularly bribe the legal service providers. When any 
confl ict arises, the result is usually to disrupt these connections or take legal actions against those 
at the receiving end. In the FGDs, slum dwellers have repeatedly expressed their satisfaction 
regarding such arrangements because despite the corruption involved in the matter they are at 
least getting a few services, which they seriously need to maintain their livelihoods. There is rarely 
any example in which there has been a direct interaction between the legal service providers and 
poor slum dwellers. 
The local government representatives in the area are the ward commissioner of DCC and their 
accountability to the service recipients is instituted through the electoral process and mutual 
arrangements with the local/community leaders. Though DCC elections are largely infl uenced 
by money, muscle power etc., those who are elected as ward commissioners are to keep their 
electorate in good humour as they have the voting power to re-elect commissioners after a certain 
interval. It is the local leaders in general who act on behalf of the ward commissioners in the 
community. Commissioners pay occasional visits to the community. 
In the horizontal sphere it is again found that ward commissioners and service providers are 
accountable to each other through an indirect mutual agreement. In practice commissioners have 
no legal authority to oversee the service providing organizations. However, they often come into 
5  Abdur Rob, FGD participants, House owners, Korail East
57
confl ict with the service providers and try to infl uence them. In such cases the community people 
collectively support the respective commissioners. On the other hand in a few instances it has 
been noticed that service providing organizations are seeking assistance from the local elected 
representatives particularly in taking important policy decisions and when they are in a serious 
confl ict with the service recipients over any matter. 
5.2.3  Upper level
At the upper level of the process fl ow there lies the DCC and the central government. The DCC is 
legally responsible to regulate all activities in relation to service delivery. But in reality they have 
little to do with this function. Frequent interferences of the central government in service delivery 
and lack of jurisdictional authority of the DCC over the majority of service providing organizations 
have lessened the DCCs service delivery responsibilities to a great extent. Currently, the DCC 
is heavily dependent on the central government in carrying out its assigned responsibilities. The 
central government formulate the rules and policies for effective service delivery by the DCC, 
can supersede the orders of the DCC, can both assign and withdraw the DCC’s authority, can 
approve its budget, can call for of any of its records and can inspect it any time. Besides, the 
central government has the legal authority to infl uence the functioning of the service providing 
organizations. This is basically done through political appointment in the managerial positions of 
the service providing organizations. Thus services for the poor are often reduced and resources are 
diverted to other sectors, which are considered politically important.
5.2.4  Accountability in CSO led Service Delivery
Three types of civil society organizations (CSOs) have been identifi ed in the study location i.e. the 
international civil society organizations (ICSOs), the national civil society organizations (NCSOs), 
and the local community based organizations (CBOs). ICSOs involves the international CSOs 
such as World Bank, IMF, Water Aid, World Vision, and Plan International. These are basically 
resource mobilizing organizations. Currently, they are found to infl uence policy makers in favor of 
a participatory and right-based approach in service delivery. Amongst the NCSOs working in the 
study community, PROSHIKA, Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP), and Dushtha Shasthya Kendra 
(DSK) deserve mention. Amongst the local CBOs, Slum Rights Protection Committee (BOSC) is in 
the leading position. Besides, there are Bastuhara (homeless) League, Bastuhara Dol, Bangladesh 
Bostibashi Union etc. 
In addition to channeling resources to the NCSOs, the ICSOs provide necessary technical and 
capacity enhancing support to the former. Thus, national or implementing CSOs are heavily 
dependent on the ICSOs’ funding. As a result, they are to perennially adjust themselves to ICSOs’ 
priorities. Besides, there are continuous monitoring and periodic evaluations of the activities of the 
implementing NCSOs by the resource mobilizing ICSOs. 
In certain instances, the service providing organizations and the government as a whole are seen 
accountable to the ICSOs. This is for the donor role of the ICSOs. Power practices in this case 
involve policy prescriptions, policy advocacy and campaign, capacity building and guiding planning 
strategies. The recent contract between central government and Transparency International (TI) 
is a case in point. As per the contract, the TI currently provides both consultative and technical 
support to the government to root out corruption in service delivery. The WaterAid Bangladesh 
provides strategic directions to the NCSOs-DWASA initiated safe water and sanitation service 
delivery program. 
In the downward direction, the NCSOs however, are accountable to the local CSOs. Usually, the 
NCSOs organize civil societies and communities and facilitate the formation of local CSOs. They 
are also responsible to enhance local CSOs’ capacity in managing the services provided, arranging 
initial cost for the installation of giving relevant infrastructures and technical support for hardware 
installation and operation.
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Local CSOs’ accountability is two-fold; they are accountable to the NCSOs and the service 
recipients. It is the local CSOs responsibility to collect the price for the services provided and then 
to deposit it according to the NCSOs’ prescriptions. Besides, they are accountable in operational 
and maintenance. On the other hand, local CSOs are also accountable to the service recipients 
to whom they provide necessary services and education and are duly paid for that. Having been 
formed in a participatory manner from among the grassroots’ service recipients they run under a 
consistent monitoring system and pressure from the service recipients. As for the comparative 
advantages of these accountability arrangements a senior manager of the WaterAid Bangladesh 
stated, “Service delivery becomes cheaper and more accountable if the service recipients are 
involved in the operational and maintenance activities. In the traditional contractor based system 
contractors tend to infl uence the engineers in their favor and the ultimate right-holders have no 
participation in that. Even the service recipients in majority of instances remain ignorant of the 
appropriate authority or the costs associated with any specifi c infrastructure service delivery. But in 
the participatory approach service recipients play a much more important role.”
Apart from the above, in the collaborative efforts between CSOs and service delivery organizations 
there is an informal coordination mechanism among the different stakeholders of a particular 
service delivery. The coordination mechanism involves amongst others workshops, seminars, and 
a few formal and informal sittings. Due to multi-level stakeholders’ involvement in a single platform 
of these efforts everyone becomes aware of his/her responsibilities and shares of the infrastructure 
services and thus accountability is ensured to each other. 
In spite of such multi-dimensional accountability in the functioning of CSOs, it has been questioned 
by some in the present study. They feel that the top CSO leadership remains unchanged for years, 
the board of directors/governors is in fact a subservient creation of the Executive Head and ultimately, 
she/he is the virtual owner of the CSO concerned. Besides, according to some, CSO activities are 
quite isolated from one another as well as half-heartedly devoted to service delivery. However, the 
survey population under the study rated CSOs as the best service providers compared to the DCC 
and other parastatal service delivery institutions.
5.3  Accountability arrangements at policy/institutional level
The policy/institutional level accountability arrangements are guided by both global policy 
instruments and national policy documents and institutions. Of the global policy instruments the 
eight UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000 are worth mentioning. The MDGs have 
clearly set targets to halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water as well as to achieve by 2020 a signifi cant improvement in the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers. 
National policy documents/institutions however involves both traditional policies/ practices and a 
few new initiatives based on some readjustment traditional policies/ practices. Below is a brief 
scrutiny of the policies/instruments in national context.
5.3.1 Traditional policies and practices
Of the traditional policies and practices there are both constitutional arrangements and some 
policies and practices in line with the constitutional provisions.
5.3.1.1  Constitutional arrangements 
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh provides for some accountability 
arrangements for the offi cials of the public service delivery organizations. Amongst these the offi ce 
of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Ombudsman, Election Commission, Public Accounts 
Committee, Administrative Tribunals and the judiciary are worth mentioning. Except the Election 
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Commission the rest of these constitutional bodies have little to do with the accountability of 
infrastructure service delivery. Moreover, the Bangladesh constitution does not have any provisions 
for DCC elections. A central Election Commission holds the elections of both national and local 
government institutions. With its present logistics and personnel it is not possible to hold free and 
fair elections by the Election Commission. Use of money and muscle power in elections has been 
a common phenomenon in Bangladesh, the DCC elections are no exception. As a result, after 
being elected in the DCC the ward commissioners concentrate more on building political networks 
and thereby to realize double or triple the amounts spent in the election. They take little care of the 
electorate. In the words of FGD participant Abdul Kuddus, after the election whenever we talked to 
the ward commissioner concerning any issue he said, “you did not elect me the commissioner, it is 
Tarek Zia (an important leader of the ruling party) who made me the DCC commissioner.”
Even though there are provisions for appealing against an election wrongdoing in reality the 
practices are very disheartening. It takes about 4-5 years to dispose of an election case that means 
the full tenure of an elected offi ce is spent to get the fi nal verdict. No scrutiny takes place and no 
one so far been prosecuted for either false declaration or taking any other illegal means in an 
election. On the other hand the Ombudsman is yet to be functional in the country. 
5.3.1.2  Civil Servants’ Accountability
The Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1976, The Government Servants 
(Conduct) Rules 1979, The Public Employees Discipline Ordinance 1985 and the Government 
Servants Rules 1985 are widely used for ensuring accountability of the civil servants in the service 
delivery organizations. As provided in the stated rules, disciplinary actions can be taken against 
any civil servant on the ground of corruption because of possessing illegal pecuniary resources or 
property, living beyond ostensible means or having a persistent reputation of corruption. Compulsory 
retirement, removal, and dismissal have been prescribed as major penalties for the corrupt offi cials. 
In spite of the stated statutory provisions for punishment there are hardly any example in the 
service delivery organizations of corrupt bureaucrats being been punished. The procedure is so 
lengthy and time-consuming that it discourages the affected people from lodging complains. From 
the records of DWASA it has been found that a corruption complain requires at least 8 to 10 years 
to be resolved. 
5.3.1.3  The Dhaka City Corporation 
The DCC currently has three level governance mechanisms i.e., the ward at the lowest level, 
the zone at the middle and the corporation at the top level. There are at present 90 wards each 
headed by an elected commissioner. There is a female ward commissioner for every three wards. 
The DCC has now ten zonal offi ces, each headed by an executive offi cer deputed from the central 
government offi cials. Overall the DCC is headed by its Mayor with the ward commissioners both 
male and female. Besides, there are fi ve ex-offi cio commissioners.6
There is hardly any transparency or accountability in the way the DCC is operating at the headquarters 
or the ward level. The ward commissioners are always too busy to provide information or receive 
complains or explain their conduct to the electorate. As illustrated by one of the FGD participants, 
“When the election is knocking at the door candidates have enough time to visit us, even they 
pledge to do everything for the slum dwellers, but after the election they just disappear from the 
scene. Even when we succeed in reaching them overcoming all hurdles they do not care a little for 
us.”
6  Managing Director, DWASA, Chairman, DESA, Chief Engineer, DPHE, Chairman, RAJUK, and Director-General, 
Health Services.
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At the headquarters level, lack of transparency and accountability is more acute. The Mayor, the 
Chief Executive Offi cer, and the department heads are never accessible to the common man. 
There are no standard operational procedures and manuals specifi cally designed for DCC work. 
There is no organization and method cell in the DCC to constantly review its work procedures, 
manpower deployments, and work assignments. There is no organized Management Information 
System for such a large organization; any important information is not readily available. The latest 
trend has been to take back to the head offi ce more and more of the functions earlier delegated 
to the zonal levels. Above all, there is no participation in DCC affairs by the poor men and women, 
who constitute about 50% of the city population. 
Occasional inspections and supervisory checks are most common monitoring practices. But 
monitoring is usually done blindly following the central government procedures. In the offi ces of 
both ward commissioners and zonal offi cers there are arrangements for receiving complaints 
but actions following such complaints are almost absent. Furthermore, the DCC offi cials and 
ward commissioners are found to be extremely dissatisfi ed at their salary/honorarium, and the 
discretionary power and authority they have. 
Apart from the above, in the recent past the service delivery role of the DCC has been squeezed to a 
great extent. It has nothing to do with water, sewerage, and drainage because these functions have 
been transferred to DWASA, though in the statute book, these are still shown as DCC functions. 
More interestingly, while surface drains are the responsibility of the DCC, the sewerage system is 
managed by DWASA and due to this duality the two organizations are very often found to blame 
each other for the poor waste disposal in the city. Again, though the city roads are under the DCC, 
it has no say in the traffi c control system, which is run by the police.
5.3.1.4  Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority
According to the existing legal framework a 12-member Management Board headed by the Managing 
Director administers the DWASA. It has eight zonal offi ces. Centrally produced traditional rules 
and manuals are seen widely practiced for the regulation of DWASA offi cials. Very recently, a few 
new initiatives have been taken to bring about accountability and transparency in the functioning 
of DWASA. It is now possible to contract out DWASA services to third parties. Already, one of the 
trade unions affi liated to the ruling parties has been awarded the billing services for two of the zonal 
areas under DWASA. Under the revised amendment of 1996, there has been a provision to hire the 
chief executive and a few other managers from the market on a competitive basis. The services of 
DWASA offi cials have been made pensionable. A reward system for better performance has been 
reorganized. Since 2002 a public-private partnership model for providing water facility to poorer 
settlements is in practice.
In spite of the stated reform measures, the current performance of DWASA in water supply has 
been reported to be very bad by the primary level respondents. In general, it has been censured 
for providing undue favor to the higher income groups of the city. Negligence, bribes, delay, and 
poor quality services are quite common in DWASA practices and it is the meter readers and other 
frontline service providers who are reportedly most corrupt. According to one of the DWASA offi cials, 
“Almost all of the meter readers and frontline engineers of DWASA are currently owners of at least 
one luxury house in the city, and in most cases it is more than one.” He further noted, ‘If you do 
not bribe them it is not possible to be promoted to the upper post, as everyone will be your enemy 
there.’ 
So it seems that the reform initiatives have failed to bring about any accountability in DWASA. 
Although the ‘Board’ of DWASA was reorganized in the recent with more representation from different 
segments of society it still lacks the representation of the poor and women. Public complaints are 
ignored, and remedial measures are taken only when there is pressure from above or violent 
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protests from below. Recent initiatives of contracting out services to trade unions further have led 
to more negligence in duties by the offi cials who have direct involvement in trade unions.
5.3.1.5  DESCO
There is no well-established manual for functioning of DESCO. At present, it is administered by a 
nine member’ ‘Board of Directors’. On the whole the accountability arrangements prescribed by 
the central government are followed here. Though there are complaint registers in the DESCO the 
service recipients rarely use those. According to the Finance and Administration Director of DESCO, 
“Usually over the telephone we receive most of the complaints.” Explaining reasons he further said, 
‘In order to avoid the probable harassment from the frontline service providers the service recipients 
make complaints over telephone rather than formally register them in the complain register.’ 
Moreover, he claimed that though the DESCO was not totally free from corruption, corrupt practices 
were not so rampant there like other service delivery organizations. Instead, as he claimed, it 
has been successful to lessen system loss to a remarkable extent and has gradually earned the 
reputation of a successful service provider. Behind the success are: the recruiting of fresh blood 
in the starting phase as well as effective monitoring, better salary, strict rules and regulations, and 
gradual contracting out of services to third party. It may be noted in this connection that stop illegal 
connections of electricity, under continuous pressure from both poor communities and CSOs, 
DESCO signed a contract with KRSP, a NCSO to provide electricity to the poor communities in 
2000. But, according to the offi cials of DESCO it could not bring any tangible result to them. 
5.3.2  New Initiatives
5.3.2.1  Public Procurement Regulation, 20037
To make uniform the various procurement practices that the different service delivery agencies 
followed the ‘Public Procurement Regulation, 2003’ was introduced in Bangladesh. According to 
the regulation, every public service providing organization is required to form a procurement entity 
within its set-up. As for the methods of tendering the Regulation emphasized the followings:
Open Tendering: Tenders should be fl oated through advertisement in the popular national dailies. 
Several committees under the procurement entity will regulate all matters of tendering. There is a 
provision for making complaint by the tenderers in case of any irregularities but the procedure is a 
very complex one and involves several different divisions, committees from several authorities. 
Restricted Tendering: For purchasing goods, works or physical labour restricted tendering has 
been prescribed in the regulation. In this case procurement is made through the already enlisted 
tenderers.
Two Stage Tendering: In case of procurement where a proposal is necessary the two stage 
tendering method has been prescribed. In this method a proposal is to be sought from among the 
tenderers with due specifi cations of the service. In the second stage the contract is to be made. 
Ironically, the regulation is still unimplemented. Even, in the regulation, the much needed people’s 
participation has been denied once again which we have seen in the previous chapter where one 
contractor described the process of paying bribe. 
7  Public Procurement Regulation, 2003, Central Procurement Technical Unit, Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation 
Division, Ministry of Planning.
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5.3.2.2  Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004
Following huge pressure both from global and national stakeholders to prevent corruption and 
other illegal practices in service delivery and to probe corruption allegations, the government 
established an Anti-Corruption Commission in 2005 as per the Anti-corruption Act, 2004. The 
commission consists of three commissioners including one chairman. In consultation with the 
selection committee8 the President appoints the commissioners. The commission has the authority 
to appoint the supporting staff as necessary. It has the authority to summons witnesses, call for 
public records, and to issue warrant orders. Moreover, it has the authority to probe any corruption 
allegations and fi ling cases thereby, to review anti-corruption measures, and to conduct research 
and mass awareness programs for combating corruption. It has been made obligatory for all public 
organizations to obtain the commission’s clearance before promoting anyone. 
The Commission has already come in for a lot of criticism from different segments of society. The 
criticism is heavily centered on the issue of politicization of the commission. The much talked 
about peoples participation has been totally ignored in the formation of the commission. Even, the 
commission is yet to be effective to produce any exemplary outcome in combating corruption. Almost 
all the FGD participants expressed their doubt of the good will of the commission to overcome the 
issue of corruption saying that “if government wishes, it is possible to combat corruption overnight, 
but they do not want this.”  
5.4 Successful versus unsuccessful initiatives: Sanitation and Water 
Services in Focus
As discussed in the ‘Forms and Stages of Infrastructure Services’ section of the study, the 
survey respondents expressed their highest satisfaction regarding sanitation service delivery and 
alternatively one of the highest dissatisfaction regarding water service delivery. In view of this, 
sanitation service delivery has been considered here as having relatively successful accountability 
arrangements and water services with one of the worst accountability mechanisms. Below, there is 
a detailed analysis of the accountability arrangements involved with these two service deliveries.
5.4.1  Accountability mechanisms in relation to Water and Sanitation Services
There are three different types of accountability mechanisms in the study locale regarding sanitation 
and water service deliveries such as CSOs-DWASA collaborative effort, CSOs-CBOs joint effort, and 
the DCC initiated service delivery. The fi rst two of these are very effective in encountering sanitation 
problems in the community as reported by both primary and secondary levels stakeholders whereas 
the last one has been strongly criticized.
5.4.1.1  CSOs-DWASA Collaborative Effort
The ‘Advancing Sustainable Environmental Health’ project funded by DFID was initiated by WaterAid 
Bangladesh during 1997-2001 involving eight NCSOs to ensure effective water and sanitation 
service delivery to the urban slums. Since June 2005 it has been replicated as a CSOs-DWASA 
partnership project. With a few improvements in the previous approach and practices and with the 
involvement of DWASA, it is now widely recognized as one of the proven models of providing slum 
dwellers with sustainable access to water and sanitation services. The collaborating parties and 
their assigned responsibilities are as follows:
8  Selection committee included fi ve members: one judge of the appellate division, one from high court division, 
Comptroller and Auditor General, Chairman of the Public Service Commission, and the immediately retired Cabinet 
Secretary.  
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Table 5.2. CSOs-DWASA approach at a glance
Collaborating Parties Identity Responsibilities
Dhaka Water Supply 
& Sewerage Authority 
(DWASA)
Local Govt. Institution Lead agency in 
the process and is 
responsible to coordinate 
the whole process as 
well as to scale up the 
operation in the slums of 
the city.
WaterAid Bangladesh & 
Plan International
International Civil Society 
Organizations
The basic responsibility 
of the International Civil 
Society Organizations 
is to mobilize fi nancial 
support and give strategic 
direction to the entire 
process.
Dushtha Shasthya Kendra 
(DSK), Assistance for 
Slum Dwellers (ASD), 
Association for Realization 
of Basic Needs (ARBAN), 
NGO Forum, Prodipon, 
Phulki, Population 
Service & Training Center 
(PSTC), Rural Health & 
Development Society 
(RHDS)
National Civil Society 
Organizations
The national civil 
society organizations 
are responsible to 
facilitate the process and 
implement the program
There are basically two types of authorities involved in the collaboration i.e. resource mobilizing 
authorities and implementation authorities. The ICSOs are acting as the resource mobilizers 
whereas the NCSOs and DWASA are acting as implementing authorities. Within the implementing 
authorities, DWASA’s role is of a supervisory kind and it is the NCSOs who do the needful at 
the implementation level. The NCSOs again need to obtain permission from the DCC’s Slum 
Development Cell for implementing water and sanitation programs in the slum locations. After 
being permitted by the DCC the next step is to form ‘Community Based Organizations’ (CBOs) in 
the concerned community in which active participation of women in leadership is a must. A nine 
member women committee with the responsibility of day to day operation and maintenance of the 
water and sanitation related infrastructure services in the community is then formed. In addition 
to this there is a fi ve member men’s advisory group. Participatory situation analysis and baseline 
survey are conducted in connection with the formation of these CBOs. The NCSOs formulate the 
rules and regulations for the effective functioning of the CBOs as well as directly supervising and 
monitoring their activities. On the other hand, because of the participatory nature of the CBOs, their 
accountability to the service recipient level also is ensured. 
The NCSOs accountability has multiple forms: they are simultaneously accountable to ICSOs, 
DWASA, DCC, and the concerned ward commissioners. In addition to providing resources, the 
ICSOs directly supervise and monitor NCSOs’ activities and provide necessary consultations. 
Secondly, for water and sewerage connections as well as for other technical support NCSOs are to 
constantly seek assistance from DWASA and DCC. Formally, NCSOs are responsible to perform 
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the mediatory role between DWASA/DCC and the CBOs. They act as both fi nancial guarantor 
and service recipient authority to these organizations on behalf of the CBOs. In this process, the 
NCSOs again get assistance and due support from the concerned ward commissioner because 
the community is his/her constituency and getting involved in the NCSOs’ programs they are 
ultimately credited for the achievement in service delivery. In line with the stated accountability 
arrangements the CSOs-DWASA collaborative effort involves a cost-recovery approach in service 
delivery targeting primarily the hardcore and moderate poor. The percentages recoverable from the 
different category households against the provided infrastructure services are as follows:
Table 5.3. Percentages recoverable from the different category households against the 
provided infrastructure services
Categories of 
households
Description
Rate for percentage 
recovery
Hardcore poor Tenants, day laborers, 
female-headed 
households etc. who lack 
a two square meals a day
20% against household 
latrines and 10% against 
water and sewerage 
services
Moderate poor Households having single 
earning members who 
again remain jobless for 
about one-third of the 
year lacking three square 
meals around half of the 
year.
60% against household 
latrines and 25% for water 
and sewerage services
Poor but relatively better 
off households
Households having more 
than one earning member 
and with the ability to 
meet the demand for 
food and housing as well 
as to pay for other basic 
services.
75% for household 
latrines and 50% for water 
and sewerage services
Not poor Households having 
regular earning sources 
and living in pucca or 
semi-pucca houses with 
basic amenities like color 
TV, Freeze etc. 
100% recovery for all 
infrastructure services 
provided
CUP’s services are totally free of cost, the initiative is driven by the need to improve hygienic 
sanitation practices in order to meet MDG/PRSP targets. The ICSOs, and in some cases 
government, bear the cost of these services. Thus, there is a positive discrimination in tariff setting 
and cost recovery mechanisms for different category households. The higher the number of the 
poor in a group the lower is the amount to be recovered. On the other hand, the operation and 
maintenance cost is 100% recoverable (the service recipients pay according to their abilities). The 
recovered amount is then ploughed back to the principal program resulting in the increased service 
benefi ciaries. As for the effectiveness of practicing such a cost-recovery approach, one of the 
senior offi cials of WaterAid Bangladesh noted, “It is contributing to building a sense of ownership 
of the infrastructural resources in the community. It also helps more people to benefi t with relatively 
less capital resources.”
65
There are clear-cut functional area distributions amongst the implementing CSOs, which help them 
avoid overlaps in their programs. It is the ICSOs’ responsibility to specify functional areas for the 
partner CSOs. Of the eight partners DSK is responsible for the study locale. The FGD participants 
repeatedly spoke about the survey conducted by the DSK and also their sanitation programs in the 
community. However, regarding water services Korail dwellers seemed a bit cautious of the DSK 
activities. They feel that though there have been some initiatives by the DSK in the recent past to 
construct water reservoirs from where water would be supplied to the community, most of them are 
still in the process of construction. ‘It is because of the high cost for building a water infrastructure, 
86,000 taka for each reservoir’ – BOSC president Abdul Mannan stated. Now because of the 
100% infrastructure cost-recovery approach CBO members repay the construction expenditure by 
instalments. CBOs need to share a large amount at the initial stage of the infrastructural set-up. It 
is diffi cult to collect such large amounts at a time by members of CBO. The primary instalments are 
often burdensome to the CBO members as it involves comparatively large amount. The result has 
been to delay the total process or to some extent denying the relevant services. There is also a fear 
of demolition of the slum any time. So, the CSOs do not feel comfortable to invest a large amount 
as it may be demolished any time leading to more vulnerability of the poor slum dwellers. 
5.4.1.2  CSOs-CBOs joint effort
PROSHIKA, a national CSO, initiated the process of people’s empowerment through building 
people’s organizations alternatively knows as CBOs. Almost a similar approach to organization 
building was adopted in the community though in a more participatory manner. At the primary level, 
15 to 20 member groups are formed targeting effective poverty alleviation. The total slum area is 
further divided into a few sub-areas. Then group federations are formed including all groups in the 
sub-areas. Group federations in a specifi c area are combined together to form an area federation. 
Thus, there is a participatory accountability arrangement in this approach and decisions are taken 
in a bottom-up manner. 
Besides, the ICSOs’ role is relatively small and confi ned to only periodic evaluations as the CSOs 
are awarded the responsibility of specifi c projects on a contract basis with the complete freedom 
to discharge their responsibility. Several instances of collaboration between CSOs and the DCC in 
relation to service delivery have been noticed. In a few recent initiatives some CBO leaders have 
been included within the service delivery mechanisms by appointing them on a regular basis. The 
approach of the Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP) is of this kind. Although initially CUP confi ned 
itself to advocacy activities recently its scope has expanded to direct infrastructure service delivery 
programs. 
Another important feature of this approach is that mostly the infrastructure service deliveries are 
free of cost. Furthermore, CSOs-CBOs joint effort is currently seen to emphasize sanitation service 
delivery. However, water service delivery has received much less consideration. In the primary phase, 
it was only which PROSHIKA dealt with the water issue in the Korail slum in that it provided each 
of its primary groups with a tube-well. But, because of the lowering of the underground water level 
since 2000-2002 these tube-wells have become dysfunctional. Later due to the uneasy relationship 
between PROSHIKA and government, it has reduced its program to sanitation services only. The 
CUP offi cials have claimed that they have just started direct service delivery interventions with the 
community. So, it has not been as yet possible for them to conduct large-scale water service delivery. 
Besides, due to the huge infrastructural cost it is not possible for them to instantly conduct any such 
infrastructure building program though they are expecting to do so gradually. According to one of 
the CBO leaders though through hectic movements it has been possible to secure the DWASA’s 
consent to provide water services legally to the slums, still the DWASA offi cials’ commitment to the 
cause is questionable. Delaying in service delivery and harassing people through manipulating 
essential documents are two of the most important allegations against the DWASA offi cials who are 
generally perceived to be obstructing such initiatives. 
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5.4.1.3  DCC initiated service delivery
There also found DCC initiatives for service delivery though they are on a limited scale and are 
carried out in coordination with the DCC’s Slum Improvement Cell and ward commissioners. These 
efforts are totally free of cost. The FGD participants, however, have observed that the DCC has 
so far provided only ten sanitary latrines for the use of the whole community. There is reportedly 
no initiative on the part of the DCC to provide the community with any water related infrastructural 
set-up as yet. 
There are allocations for slum improvement in the DCC budget for the ward commissioners. On the 
other hand, there is a continuous pressure from both the donor communities and from the global 
governance to provide the slum dwellers with increased infrastructure services. So, the concerned 
authorities are trying to concentrate on low-cost infrastructural settings like sanitation. Also the 
argument that slum dwellers are all illegal occupants and can be evicted any time provide the DCC 
authority with an opportunity to under-emphasize large infrastructural set-ups like water reservoirs 
in the community. 
Thus, it would be clear that the CSOs-DWASA collaborative effort and the CSOs-CBOs joint effort 
has been relatively successful to enable the poorer with more access to water and sanitation services 
than that of the DCC initiated interventions. Again, of the two services sanitation is reportedly more 
successful than the water service. 
5.5  Lessons learnt
In view of the above, the study confi rms that the participation of the service recipients in the 
decision-making process is important for effective and sustainable delivery of services for the 
urban poor. Secondly, the cost-recovery approach creates a sense of ownership within the service 
recipients over the infrastructural set-up in the community and so they become more conscious 
of the services. Besides, the involvement of local government representatives in service delivery 
imparts more sustainability to the services as people have then more opportunity to share their 
problems with the local representatives and at least from on humanitarian ground the later are to 
act for the community. 
However, if there is no effective coordination between all the stakeholders of a specifi c service 
delivery the whole initiative is bound to be ineffective as in the case of water services reviewed 
under the study. 
Another important learning is that inadequate policy instruments coupled with confl icting authorities 
(central versus local and institutional) create strong barriers in the way of effective service delivery 
because they allow the service providers to overlook their responsibilities. So, what is important 
is to ensure uniform and adequate policies as well as the simplifi cation of the procedures of 
infrastructure service delivery. 
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6. Conclusion and recommendations
6.1  Conclusion
This case study examined six important infrastructure services of Dhaka city i.e., water 
supply, sanitation, drainage, access to roads and paving, solid waste management, and 
street lighting. There is a great deal of overlap in the activities of service providing institutions 
as well as variation in the approaches of the different service providing agencies working in 
the community and in the relevant policies in this fi eld. Such overcrowding of institutions and 
policy vacuum in the infrastructure sector has meant corruption has become widespread 
within the service delivery organizations with the result that the poorer people have only 
limited access or no access to essential services.    
The study showed that whilst the people (including the urban poor) do receive services, they 
complain about their quality and price.  Where services are delivered to “illegal” slums, these 
are provided ‘off the books’ or given out of charity. Thus people can’t complain because they 
always risk being evicted or arrested as illegal occupants. Furthermore, the few people able to 
get connected to services such as water or electricity, then sell service to households at high 
prices. In addition, the collaboration between “musclemen”--that is, middlemen with political 
clout, and offi cials is key to understanding the situation. The study shows that corruption is 
just one part of a complex system that provides low quality services to the poor, maintains 
political power of some, enriches others, and wastes lots of resources.
Corruption is embedded in the life of the slum and cannot be tackled in isolation from the 
conditions that produce it. It will do absolutely no good to arrest a few corrupt offi cials. 
Under an honest system, the poor would receive no services. Thus what is needed is a 
change in the underlying relationship between the slum dwellers and the state. Their status 
needs to be legalized. There need to be legal and safe ways for them to complain, and the 
implicit subsidies caused by the misreading or meters, illegal taping into lines, etc. need to 
be replaced by legal subsidies. So that the current set-up where inadequate services are 
provided corruptly is replaced with somewhat better services provided honestly.
6.2  Recommendations
In both the quantitative and qualitative parts of the study the respondents suggested 
some measures that they thought would be most useful to combat corruption and ensure 
accountability of the service providing organizations. A variety of responses were obtained 
as presented below in a descending priority order. 
To combat corruption the fi rst and foremost task is to reform the existing penal measures 
by making the process of trial shorter and providing for larger sentences for those found 
guilty.
There should be a proper investigation of any corruption allegation.
Those who report corruption should be given more protection by the state.
Appropriate program for public awareness building through a mass campaign should be 
taken implemented.
A free fl ow of information regarding both government expenditure and functioning should 
be ensured.
Moral values as a means for combating corruption should be promoted through appropriate 
education reform.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Important recommendations extracted from the qualitative investigations as listed below:
Coordination amongst all of the stakeholders of service delivery including government, CSOs 
and the community level participants should be ensured. 
Political will must be created to combat corruption. As in the words of slum development offi cer, 
DCC ‘If Mayor wishes it is possible to root out corruption from the DCC within one day’. However, 
politicians tend to be part of the corrupt network and benefi t from being providers of patronage. 
Are there realistic ways of gaining their support by maintaining patronage while reducing the 
amount of money and benefi ts that fl ow into private pockets?
The NGOs are an important factor and seem to sometimes be a counterweight
to corrupt offi cials. They might have more bargaining power vis a vis offi cials so they could get 
a better deal. However, NGOs also had to pay bribes. 
An obvious fi rst step toward a solution would seem to be to regularize slum households’ residency 
by legalizing the settlement or giving them title to their land for a nominal fee with generous 
fi nancing (following positive examples with shanty towns in Latin America).
•
•
•
•
•
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Table A1.1.  Access and uses of different services (% of Households)
Services Access Use
House 
owner
Tenant House 
Owner
Tenant
Water 100 98 100 97
Sanitation 92 83 92 81
Electricity and 
Street lighting
96 80 96 74
Roads and 
paving
92 72 92 72
Drainage 81 49 81 49
Solid Waste 
Management
67 57 67 57
Appendices
Appendix I. Tables for Executive Summary 
Table A1.2. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of different services (% of Households)
Services House Owner Tenant
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Water 12 88 75 12 87 146
Sanitation 48 52 69 46 54 122
Electricity & 
Street lighting
10 90 72 8 92 111
Roads and 
paving
9 91 69 15 85 108
Drainage 18 82 61 39 61 74
Solid Waste 
Management
28 72 50 20 80 85
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Appendix 2. Tables for Figures
Table A2.1. Educational status of the household members (% of Households) 
(see Figure 1.1) 
Educational Qualifi cations House Owner Tenant
Illiterate         18.9 32.3
Know the alphabet/ can sign only   22.9 24.1
Primary 30.1 32.1
Secondary 17.3 8.3
SSS 4.5 1.6
HSC  3.7 .9
Degree 1.3 .4
Masters .5 --
Vocational/technical .3 --
Refuse to answer .3 .4
Total (N) 375 564
Table A2.2. Income status of the studied households (% of Households) 
(see Figure 1.2)
Average Monthly Income (Tk.) House Owner Tenant
<=1000 0.00 1.33
1001 - 2000 2.67 10.67
2001 - 3000 12.0 28.0
3001 - 4500 21.33 42.67
4501 - 6000 30.67 10.67
6001 + 33.33 6.67
Total (N) 75 150
Table A2.3. Access and use of water service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.1.)
Response
Access Use
House 
Owner
Tenant House 
Owner
Tenant
Yes 100.0 98.0 100.0 97.33
No - 2.0 - 2.67
Total (N) 75 150 75 150
Table A2.4 Faced problems with water supply (% of Households) (see Figure 3.2)
Response House Owner Tenant
Yes 90.67 94.67
No 9.33 5.33
Total (N) 75 150
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Table A2.5. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of water service (% of Households)  
(see Figure 3.3)
Response House Owner Tenant
Satisfaction 12.0 12.33
Dissatisfaction 88.00 87.67
Total (N) 75 146
Table A2.6. Monthly service cost for water service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.4)
Monthly Cost for Water (in 
taka)
House Owner Tenant
<=50  1.33 8.90
51-100 26.67 61.64
101-150 21.33 17.12
151-200 16.00 4.10
201-300 13.33 5.47
301-500 16.00 2.05
>500 Above 5.33 0.68
Total (N) 75 146
Table A2.7. Access and use of sanitary service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.5)
Response Access Use
House Owner Tenant House Owner Tenant
Yes 92.0 83.33 92.0 81.33
No 8.0 16.67 8.0 18.67
Total (N) 75 150 75 150
Table A2.8. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of sanitation service (% of Households) 
(see Figure 3.6)
Response House Owner Tenant
Satisfaction 47.83 45.90
Dissatisfaction 52.17 54.10
Total (N) 69 122
Table A2.9. Access and use of electricity and street lighting service (% of Households) 
(see Figure 3.7)
Response
Access Use
House Owner Tenant House Owner Tenant
Yes 96.0 80.0 96.0 74.0
No 4.0 20.0 4.0 26.0
Total (N) 75 150 75 150
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Table A2.10. Faced problems with electricity and street lighting  (% of Households) 
(see Figure 3.8)
Response House Owner Tenant
Yes 96.00 93.33
No 4.00 6.67
Total (N) 75 150
Table A2.11. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of electricity and street lighting service 
(% of Households) (see Figure 3.9)
Response House Owner Tenant
Satisfaction 9.72 8.11
Dissatisfaction 90.28 91.89
Total (N) 72 111
Table A2.12. Monthly service cost for electricity and street lighting (% of Households) 
(see Figure 3.10)
Monthly cost for electricity and 
street lighting (in taka)
House Owner Tenant
51-100 4.17 49.54
101-150 4.17 8.11
151-200 27.78 27.93
201-300 29.17 13.51
301-500 23.61 .90
>500 Above 11.11 -
Total (N) 72 111
Table A2.13 Access and use of roads and paving service (% of Households) 
(see Figure 3.11)
Response
Access Use
House Owner Tenant House Owner Tenant
Yes 92.0 72.0 92.0 72.0
No 8.0 28.0 8.0 28.0
Total (N) 75 150 75 150
Table A2.14 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of roads and paving service delivery 
(% of Households) (see Figure 3.12)
Response House Owner Tenant
Satisfaction 8.70 14.81
Dissatisfaction 91.30 85.19
Total (N) 69 108
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Table A2.15. Access and use of drainage service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.13)
Response
Access Use
House Owner Tenant House Owner Tenant
Yes 81.33 49.33 81.33 49.33
No 18.67 50.67 18.67 50.67
Total (N) 75 150 75 150
Table A2.16. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about drainage service delivery 
(% of Households) (see Figure 3.14)
Response House Owner Tenant
Satisfaction 18.03 39.19
Dissatisfaction 81.97 60.81
Total (N) 61 74
Table A2. 17. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about solid waste management  
(% of Households) (see Figure 3.15)
Response House Owner Tenant
Satisfaction 28.0 20.00
Dissatisfaction 72.0 80.00
Total(N) 50 85
Table A2.18. Prime victims of corruption (% of Households) (see Figure 4.1)
Victims House Owner Tenant
Poor People 54.67 76.00
Slum dwellers 40.00 16.67
Powerless 5.33 6.00
Those who have no political 
affi liation
- 1.33
Total (N) 75 150
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Appendix 3. Questionnaire for Household Survey
Form ID no:
Date:       /           /2005
Name of Interviewer:
Location:
Time:
Primary/basic information
1 Name of Slum                   : 
1.1 Ward                                : 
1.2 Thana                               : 
1.3 District                            : 
1.4 Name of Respondent      : 
1.5 Religion
Muslim-1, Hindu-2, Christian-3, Buddhist-4 
1.6  Status of the respondent in the family:
Household head-1, Wife/husband of the household head-2, 
Member of the Household-3, Others-99
1.7 Name of head of household : 
1.8 How long has this person lived in this slum (in years)? 
Household Roster
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9
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Codes for Questions
2.4 Age
1-12 years 1
13-24 years 2
25-36 years 3
37-48 years 4
49-60 years 5
61 year or older 6
Refuse to answer  7
2.5 Marital Status 
Married 1
Divorced 2
Separated 3
Widow or widower 4
Never Married 5
2.6 Relationship to the head of household
Head 1
Wife/Husband 2
Child/Adopted child 3
Grand child 4
Niece/Nephew 5
Father/Mother 6
Sister/Brother 7
Son in law/Daughter in law 8
Sister in law 9
Grandfather/Mother 10
Father in law/Mother in law 11
Other Relative 12
Servant or Servant’s Relative 13
Tenant/Tenant’s Relative 14
Others 99
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2.7 Educational Qualifi cations
Illiterate 1 HSC 6
Literate 2 Degree 7
Primary 3 Diploma 8
Secondary 4 Masters 9
SSS 5 Vocational/technical 10
Refuse to answer 11
2.8 
& 
2.9 
Main and Secondary occupation
Service (Govt.) 1 Remittance 8
Service (Private) 2 Rickshaw/CNG/other 
vehicles driver
9
Labour 3 Money lender 10
Business 4 Small business 11
House owner/Shop rent 5 Raw materials seller/
vendor
12
Broker/Contractor 6 Housewife 13
Student 7 Unemployed 14
Others 99
Livelihoods
Q 1 What are the different sources of livelihood for your household? 
(Priority wise main three)
1. Micro-enterprise/self employed
2. Labourer
3. Agriculture
4. Migration
5. Rent
6. Saving/remittances/pension
7. NGO
8. Business
9. Public sector (government)
10. Informal employment
11. Other (SPECIFY)
Q 2. Average Household Income 
(From all sources of income) Total amount ........................
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Q 3. Do you think you have a voice 
in decisions about how the city 
is run?
Yes  1
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q4. Do you have adequate number 
of meals every day?
Yes  1
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q5. Do you feel safe where you 
live? 
Yes  1
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q6. Are there health risks where 
you live? 
Yes  1 (SPECIFY)
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q7. Have you experienced threat of 
removal from land/house - from 
landlords, property developers, 
and landowners?
Yes  1
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q8. Is your house near employment, 
transport links, health-care, 
education and other social 
services and civic amenities?
Yes  1
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q9. Do you have access to credit 
and loan?
Yes  1
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q10. In the past how have you coped with a crisis (such as losing a job, sickness, 
business loss, dowry etc.)?  (Priority wise main three)
1. Sales of household assets
2. Ask for help from extended family
3. Ask for help from friends and 
neighbours
4. Contact infl uential people in your 
community/Individuals patron/
client relations
5. Affi liation with social and political 
institutions
6. Find other jobs/diversifi cation of 
livelihood strategies
7. Self-help groups/collectives 
8. Credit and Loan 
9. Don’t know
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Service Delivery
Q. 11. Fill up the following table related to service delivery:
Services Access & Use
Service 
cost 
(monthly)
Satisfi ed Dissatisfi ed
Water
Sanitation
Electricity & 
Street lighting
Roads and 
paving
Drainage
Solid Waste 
Management
Q12. Have you approached any of the 
service providers with a problem? 
Yes  1 (SPECIFY WHICH)
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q13. Were your problems solved by the 
agency?
Yes  1 (SPECIFY WHICH)
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q 14. Do service providers regularly 
monitor their services? 
Yes  1 (SPECIFY WHICH)
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q15. How often have you had personal contact with a service provider in last year? 
Services How often (code)
Water
Sanitation
Electricity & Street lighting
Roads and paving
Drainage
Solid Waste Management
Code: Once a month-1, More often-2, Less than once a month-3, Once in last year-4, Don’t know-5
Q16. Were you happy with the 
behaviour of staff? 
Yes  1 (SPECIFY WHICH)
No  2 
Don’t know  3
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Q17. What are the most important problems in the delivery of infrastructure 
(Please refer to the most important three problems)? 
Services Types/nature of problem
Water
Sanitation
Electricity & Street lighting
Roads and paving
Drainage
Solid Waste Management
Codes for types of problem:
Irregular Service delivery - 1 High cost - 2 Low quality service - 3 
Mismanagement - 4  Have to pay bribe for service - 5 Harassment - 6 Others - 7 
Q18. Do you think you have enough 
information about infrastructure 
services?
Yes  1 (SPECIFY WHICH)
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Corruption in Society
Q19. What do you mean by “corruption”?
Codes:
To accept bribe - 1 Nepotism - 2  Mismanagement - 3 Illegal toll collection - 4
Terrorism - 5  Illegal power play - 6 Forcible occupation - 7
Ransom collection through captivity - 8  Others (Please specify) - 99
Q20. Can you think of an example of corruption in relation to infrastructure service delivery?
Q21. Whether corruption a burning problem in the public, NGO or the private sector? 
(Choose three in order of priority)
1. Public sector
2. Private sector
3. NGO
4. About the same
5. Don’t know
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Q22. Whether corruption a serious problem in the other spheres of the society? 
(Choose three in order of priority) 
1. Business
2. Education
3. Community organizations
4. Religious institutions
5. Sport
6. Different Committees 
Q23. Which do you think is the leading cause of corruption in society? 
(Priority wise main three)
Codes:
Poverty - 1, Political Infl uence - 2, 
Unimplemented law - 3, 
Lack of Accountability - 4, 
Administrative diffi culty - 5, 
Mass unawareness - 6, 
Domination of the local elite - 7, 
Personnel gain - 8, Misuse of Power - 9, 
Lack of moral education - 10, 
Easiest way to earn - 11, 
Greater scope to avoid punishment - 12, 
Others (Please specify) - 99
Corruption in infrastructure Service Delivery
Q24. Amongst the various infrastructure services, which would you think have the greatest 
levels of corruption?
Codes:
Water - 1, Sanitation - 2, 
Electricity & Street Lighting - 3, 
Road & Pavement - 4, Drainage - 5, 
Waste Management - 6
Q25. Whether any service provider 
asked you or anyone you know to pay a 
bribe for his or her services within the 
last one-year period?
Yes  1
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q26. What happened? 
1. The service provider asked for tips/bribe
2. The offer actually made by the 
respective citizen
3. Everyone knows you have to pay 
something extra
4. Don’t know
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Q27. What do you think would be the consequences if you/they disagreed to pay? 
1. Would make no difference to service
2. Would get an inferior service
3. Would have receive threats/harassment
4. There would be delay/denial of services
Q28. How often do you think the average person pays a bribe to someone? 
1. Every day
2. Every week
3. Every month
4. Every year
Q29. How much do you think the 
average person typically pays as bribe 
a year?
Total amount (In taka)……………………..
Q30. What in your consideration should be the punishment to a service provider if found 
guilty of corruption? (Priority wise main three)
1. Should sack of his/her position and to 
imprison the
2. Should sack of his/her position and to 
impose penalty to incur the due losses
3. Should sack of his/her position only
4. Depends on the severity of the crime
5. There should be no punishment for 
corruption
6. Don’t know
Q31. What impact does paying bribes have on you and your household? 
(Choose three in order of priority)
Codes:
Cannot have enough food to eat - 1, 
Incur debt burden - 2, 
Incur loss in business - 3, 
Pecuniary loss - 4, To fall in crises - 5, 
Deprived of treatment facilities - 6, 
Cannot spend according to necessities - 7, 
Cannot save - 8, 
Others (please specify) - 99
Q32. How do you feel when you are to confront any kinds of corruption? 
(Choose three in order of priority)
Codes:
Frightened/ intimidated - 1, 
Felt Powerless - 2,
Feel embarrassed - 3, Feel depressed - 4
Others (please specify) - 99
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Q33. Whom do you consider the prime victims of corruption?
Codes:
Poor people - 1, Slum dwellers - 2, 
Powerless - 3, 
Those who have no political affi liation - 4, 
Those out of government services - 5, 
Low paid service holders - 6, 
Others (please specify) - 99
Q34. Are there any institutions/persons 
that can be consulted with when there 
are any evidences of corruption?
Yes  1
No  2 
Don’t know  3
Q35. If yes, then please specify them
Codes:
NGOs - 1, Local Government - 2, 
Local Administration - 3 , Neighbors - 4, 
Relatives - 5, Political elite in affi liation with 
ruling party - 6, Political elite in affi liation 
with opposition party - 7,  
Others (please specify) - 99
Q36. Which of the infrastructure service delivery relevant problems solved off by the 
community initiatives and for which did you asked for external support during the last one-
year period?
Codes for community initiatives:
Electricity connection - 1, Water supply - 2, 
Sanitation - 3, Drainage - 4, Construction 
of road inside the slums - 5, 
Drain waste management - 6, 
Others (please specify) - 99
Codes for external support:
Sanitation - 7, Construction of Drain - 8, 
Construction of Roads - 9, Establishment 
of Educational Institutions - 10, 
Establishment of Religious Institutions - 
11, Others (please specify) - 99
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Fighting/Combating Corruption
Q37. Do you fi nd the following ways of fi ghting corruption as effective or ineffective? 
Tight prosecutions and longer sentences 
for corruption
Increased opportunity to be informed 
about the way government works and their 
means of expenditures
Corruption relevant news investigations
Campaign to raise public awareness of the 
extent and costs of corruption
Explicit codes of conduct to promote 
professional ethics
Promoting moral values in everyday 
practice
Increasing salaries of public employees
More ways for citizens to report corruption
More protection for people who report 
corruption
Special government agency dedicated to 
fi ghting corruption
Community/local actions to fi ght corruption
Q38. Which role do you consider more crucial to fi ght corruption?
1. Government 
2. NGOs
3. Politicians
4. Service providers
5. Others (please specify)
Q39. Is it possible to combat corruption 
by the mass people?
Yes - 1 No - 2  Don’t know - 3
Q40. If the answer is yes, then how? (Choose three in order of priority)
Codes:
Enforcement of strict policy to combat 
corruption - 1, Laws require to be 
implemented in full - 2, If general mass 
can be made aware - 3, Collective action 
by the mass people to resist corruption 
- 4, Transparency within the service 
providing organizations and increased 
opportunity to be informed of their services 
- 5, Appropriate monitoring arrangements 
from the part of the government - 6, 
Government must be made accountable 
to the public - 7, Elected representatives 
must be honest and competent - 8, 
Emphasizing moral education - 9, 
Others (please specify) - 99
Thank you for completing this questionnaire.
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Appendix 4. Checklist for Focus Group Discussion 
Participants: House Owners/Tenants
No of Participant: 6-8
Duration: 1 Hour
Service Delivery
What does service delivery means? Are you satisfi ed with service delivery?
Existing services in the households and defi ne their legality. 
Sources of above mentioned services and probable charges.
Evaluation of participants about the quality of services (Water supply, sanitation, electricity 
and street lighting, roads and paving, drainage and solid waste management).
Are there any problems with supply?
If you have a problem, whom do you speak to?
Is there any community involvement in service delivery? Does all the professionals of the 
society have a voice in service delivery?
Do you trust service providers?
Identify the legality of the settlement and probable risks 
Corruption 
Are bribes required/offered or demanded for service delivery and getting quick service? 
How do you avoid paying bribes? Do you think that it is the informal strategies for combating 
corruption?
What happens if you don’t pay bribes? 
How much the average person usually pay as bribe?
Which services do you usually pay bribes for?
How do you think corruption (in service delivery and general) can be stopped?
What do you think about accountability initiatives to combat corruption?
Describe any events of corruption from your experiences.
Livelihoods  
What are the costs of this kind of corruption for you? Financial (in terms of income, 
impacts on employment/enterprises); Social (violence or harassment; gender relations; 
household relations; levels of trust/cooperation in society); Human (Health, information, 
skills); Natural (access to land, water resources etc.); Physical (access to infrastructure 
services)
Are there any benefi ts of corruption for you?  
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Appendix 5. Questionnaire for Semi-structured Interviews/Informal 
Discussion with Service Providers 
Date:  / /
Name of the Interviewer:
Location:
Background Information
Name of the respondent:
Sex:
Age:
Marital Status:
Educational qualifi cation:
Occupation:
Designation:
Income: Total amount (monthly)
Other facilities from service (Residence, transport, health allowances etc):
Satisfaction/dissatisfaction related to these facilities:
(Reasons for satisfaction and dissatisfaction should be mentioned)
General Issues 
Please describe the aims and objectives of your organization/institution. Do you think 
you are fully successful to implement those aims and objectives? If not, what are the 
constraints? 
Does the functions/policies of the organization are pro-poor? How?
What are the policies of this organization regarding service delivery? Do you think these 
policies are properly implemented? If no, why?
Is there any provision to know the opinion of general people regarding service delivery in 
your organization? If so, how?
Corruption
It is generally said that ‘the main constraint to implement policies of your organization/
institution is corruption’-do you disagree with this? Why? 
What do you actually mean by corruption? Do you think that your organization is free from 
corruption? Why or why not?
Can you describe any case of corruption in your organization? What is the result?
Is there a commitment to fi ght corruption within the organization? Please briefl y describe 
anti-corruption regulations related to service delivery.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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What is the policy on personal accepting, soliciting payments/bribes/gifts/benefi ts/hospitality?
 Forbidden
 Accepted
 Depends on situation
Do the organization provides specifi c trainings on integrity and honesty issues? 
Are staffs required to report attempts to bribe/induce/undermine the impartiality/independence 
of staff?
Are policies and procedures clear to employees?
How do you punish the corrupt staff? What sanctions are applicable to staff for accepting/
procuring bribes?
Is there any accountability mechanism taken currently for combating corruption? 
If so, what are the mechanisms? 
Have there been any improvements to levels of corruption since taking reforms? 
Do you have any suggestion regarding the improvements of corruption?
Are there any NGOs or independent actors to monitor services?
Ethics
Is there a code of conduct for staff? Does it specially address corruption issue? Is it effective for 
combating corruption?
Is the integrity of the staff monitored?
Is there protection for whistle blowers? Are informants protected against retaliation?
Complaints
Is there a complaint center within the organization/institution? Is it known? Is it used?
Are there complaints procedures?
What happened if a complaint about corruption is valid?
Can you sight any event of problem resolution?
Procurement 
Describe the process of procurement (through procurement committee, tender, open or close 
system, one or two way documentation process). 
In case of procurement through tendering, please describe the related procedures. 
(Characteristics of tender, process of quality record of the goods, period of tender, the selection 
procedures of tender etc.). 
Is there any monitoring system to monitor the contractors (those who have getting the contracts) 
activity? 
What are the results of any indiscretion by the procurement related people?  
Do you disqualify contractors who have attempted to bribe an offi cial? 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Human Resources
Is there a fair system for recruiting, discipline and promoting staff?
Are their fair pay and benefi ts for staff?
How do you ensure transparency?
 Rotation of offi cers (transfer, deputation)  
 Decisions validated and activity monitored by other department offi cials
 Or other way
How the inter-departmental coordination done in specifi c service delivery related issue (for 
example: electricity connection in a new area)? 
Are there any coordination between different (government/private/civil society/ local government 
or local people) service providers? If so, how? If not, why?
Are the public involved in shaping service delivery e.g. budget priorities?
Are regulations, policy guidelines publicly available? If yes, from where and how it can be 
collected?  
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Appendix 6. Questionnaire for Semi-structured Interviews/Informal 
Discussion with Contractors 
Date:  / /
Name of the Interviewer:
Location:
Time:
Background Information
Name of the respondent:
Sex:
Age:
Marital Status:
Religion:
Educational qualifi cation:
Occupation and Income
Occupation Duration of 
involvement
Present Income Hostility among 
occupations if any
Occupation - 1
Occupation - 2
Occupation - 3
Information about Entrepreneurship
Business Initial Capital Existing Capital Sources of Capital
About Business Dealings
How do you obtain contract for your businesses?•
By dropping tender on advertisement
Through personal connection
Appointing lobbyists
Through political infl uence
Others (specify)
Is there suffi cient supervision in the businesses by the concerned authority?•
What might be the consequences in case of deviation of standards specifi ed in the contract 
for materials used?
•
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Is there any participation of the local government in setting of any service providing 
infrastructures? If so, then how?
•
Is there any participation of the local community to which the services are being rendered? 
If so then how?
•
About Corruption
How do you actually perceive corruption?
How do you rated corruption in terms of your business dealings?
Usual
Moderate
Corruption Free
Others
Do you consider corruption a must behind the prevailing socio-economic conditions? Yes / No
Reasons for considering corruption a must
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Insecurity
Each and every supplementary issue should 
be covered
Low income/salary
Competition
Luxury
Part of cultural life
Others
What are the different aspects/stages of corruption concerning to your present occupation?•
Aspects/stages of Corruption Amount (Approximately) Importance Ranking
Corruption in license 
obtaining 
Corruption in information 
securing
Tender relevant
Relevant to supervision/
monitoring 
Related to fi nancial 
management
Political corruption
Others (specify)
What are the natures of corruption?
Financial transactions, Materialistic transactions, Social privileges, Political infl uence, 
Subscription, Income tax fraud, Others
•
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Please tell us any of the single corruption cases in relation to anyone of the issues of your 
occupation as you have experienced so far. (Procuring of license, to secure information, tender 
relevant, relevant to supervision and monitoring, linking to fi nancial management, political 
infl uence etc.)
What are the possible impacts of corruption in connection to your profession?
Deviation in quality output, reducing of workers facilities, lengthy implementation 
procedures, business defaults, declining of quality businessmen, hazards in personal 
life, impacts on poor, and any other impacts.
Please specify the remarkable changes in relation to your occupation in the last one-year 
period. 
•
•
•
Changes in Policy
Changes in Customs and Practices
Changes because of Displacing of Offi cers
Others
Whether the changes have been supplementary to effectively deals with accountability and 
corruption? If so, then how?
Reporting Complains
If there is any arrangements to report corruption? What is the dispute resolution strategy?
Do you ever report of any such corruption? What had been the reason? What has been the 
consequence?
Do you consider your front line offi cials’ corruption free? If not then what are the stages for 
corruption?
What might be the consequences for practicing honesty in your profession?
Corruption and Violence
There is a general consensus that ‘illegal earnings manifest inequality in the society and thus 
accelerate violence’ - do you agree or disagree? Why?
‘Corruption is often reputed to be mixed up with illegal tool collection’ - do you of the same 
opinion? How?
Combating Corruption
What is to be done to effectively curb corruption?
What, in your opinion should be the role of civil society and local government to curb 
corruption?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Appendix 7. Checklist for Elected Representatives
General Issues
As an elected representatives please identify the problems related to infrastructure service 
delivery (water, sanitation, electricity and street lighting, roads and paving, drainage and 
solid waste management) in your locality.
Identify the nature of these problems in the context of Korail slum.
Identify your roles and responsibilities (as an elected representatives) regarding the above 
issues.
Identify the constraints to execute the roles and responsibilities properly.
Corruption
As an elected representative of the locality, do you agree that corruption is the main 
constraint to implement the above mentioned issues? Give the opinion from your own 
experience.
In your opinion, what are the main causes of corruption in the infrastructure service 
delivery?
Amongst the various infrastructure services, which would you think have the greatest 
levels of corruption? 
Is there any accountability mechanism taken for combating corruption currently?
If so, what are the mechanisms? 
Have there been any improvements to levels of corruption since taking reforms? 
Complaints
Is there a complaint center in your offi ce? Is it known? Is it used?
Are there complaints procedures?
What happened if a complaint about corruption is valid?
Can you sight any event of problem resolution?
Peoples Participation 
Identify the levels of participation of the people in shaping service delivery e.g. budget 
priorities. 
Identify the involvement of local government in the implementation stage of service 
delivery.
Identify the involvement of local people in the implementation stage of service delivery.
In the local context, identify the roles of government, NGOs and civil society regarding 
service delivery.
Combating Corruption
What should be done to combat corruption effectively?
What role civil society and local government can play to combat corruption?  
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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